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REFORMING STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS
TO COMPLY WITH TITLE VI
Bradford C. Mank*

I. INTRODUCTION

A major disagreement exists about whether the redevelopment of
contaminated "brownfield" properties in low-income and minority neighborhoods is essential for economic development in those areas, or
whether it exacerbates existing cumulative pollution problems in these
communities. l The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has
not yet resolved how to balance its interest in promoting economic development of brownfields in minority communities with its obligations
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Ace to prevent states and local
governments from discriminating against minorities.3 This Article will
discuss whether state voluntary cleanup statutes violate Title VI and proposes several ideas to reduce the possibility that a brownfield project will
cause adverse disparate impacts to a minority group. It proposes several
ways to increase participation by minority communities in the brownfield
redevelopment process and to collect more and better information about
possible health impacts on those communities.
Many developers avoid redeveloping abandoned former industrial
sites because they fear the environmental liability they may incur in
cleaning up the property before they can reuse it.4 To address this prob* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987; A.B.,
Harvard, 1983.
1. See Joel B. Eisen, Brownfield Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'y F. 187, 219-21 (1999); Paul Stanton KibeI, The Urban Nexus: Open Space,
Brownfields, and Justice, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 589, 605-13 (1998); infra notes
10-15 and accompanying text.
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
3. See REPORT OF THE TITLE VI IMPLEMENTATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NEXT
STEPS FOR EPA, STATE, AND LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS 19-20 (1999)
[hereinafter REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE].
4. See CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND
REUSING CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES vii-viii, 1-3 (1997); Todd S. Davis & Kevin D.
Margolis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 3-14 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997); Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 883, 886-87, 898-912
(1996); Stephen M. Johnson, The Brownfields Action Agenda: A Model for Future Federal/State Cooperation in the Quest for Environmental Justice?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
85 (1996); Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment:
Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705 (1994); Larry
Schnapf, State-by-State Survey of Brownfield and Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 28 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 2488, 2488 (Mar. 27, 1998); R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration
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lem, state and federal brownfield programs seek to encourage the redevelopment of environmentally contaminated land, especially abandoned or
underused former industrial sites in impoverished inner-city communities.s
While EPA has pursued several initiatives to encourage reuse of
brownfield sites,6 states have supervised most brownfield cleanups.7 By
1998, forty-four states had voluntary cleanup statutes that frequently reduced
cleanup standards, limited future environmental liability, and expedited
administrative approval for many contaminated sites. s EPA has shown
greater interest in brownfield redevelopment, completing more cleanups
of large Superfund sites and turning its attention to smaller sites. 9
In theory, developing abandoned and unused contaminated property
should benefit a community by creating new jobs, expanding the property
tax base, and eliminating existing pollution. 1O Yet state voluntary cleanup
statutes that authorize relaxed cleanup standards for redevelopment of
brownfield sites raise troubling questions about whether such projects
may increase health risks to the surrounding community. 11 After all,
states, in most cases, would eventually clean up brownfield sites to meet
strict residential standards, unless the site qualifies for a voluntary action
program that allows for lower commercial or industrial standards. In particular, forty-one states consider future land use as a factor in determin-

and Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENVTL. L. 101 (1995).
5. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 1-3; Eisen, supra note 4, at 886-88,
894-95; Becky Jacobs, Basic Brownfields, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 265, 265306 (1996-97); infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
6. EPA has awarded 227 Brownfield Assessment Demonstration pilot grants of up to
$200,000 and 16 Showcase Community grants of up to $1 million. See Carol Browner,
Speech at Brownfields 98 Conference (Nov. 16, 1998); Office of Emergency and Remedial
Response, U.S. EPA, SUPERFUND REFORMS ANN. REP. FY 1998, at 14, EPA-540-R-99-002
(1999) [hereinafter SUPERFUND REFORMS].
7. See Superfund: States Taking on More Responsibility with Hazardous Waste
Cleanups, Panel Says, NAT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 16, 1998, at d8 [hereinafter BNA
Superfund] (reporting states have more than 13,700 cleanups in progress, have completed
more than 5500 in FY 1997 and are also overseeing more than 5000 voluntary cleanups).
8. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1998 UPDATE, Table V-22 (1998) [hereinafter ELI SUPERFUND
REpORT] (reporting as of 1998, 44 states had voluntary cleanup statutes); David B. Hawley,
The Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997: North Carolina Creates an Additional Incentive to Reclaim Contaminated Properties, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1015, 1026-27 n.65 (1998)
(listing states with voluntary action programs); BNA Superjimd, supra note 7, at d8 (reporting as of 1998, 44 states had voluntary cleanup statutes); infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
9. See Jenna Greene, Super Fight over Superjimd, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 27, 1999, at 10.
10. See E. Lynn Grayson, Facilitating Good Decision, An Alliance of Necessity: EnviroJustice and Brownfields, 14 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. (Nov. 1998), at 4; Rodger
C. Field, Siting, Justice, and the Environmental Laws, 16 N.ILL. U. L. REv. 639, 652 (1996).
11. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 708-10,767-68; Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment: Using Stakeholder Theory 10 Craft
Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 37-38 (1995); Kris Wemstedt & Robert Hersh,
"Through a Lens Darkly": Superfund Spectacles on Public Participation at BrolVnfield
Sites, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENV'T 153, 159-60 (1998).
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ing cleanup standards, allowing less stringent cleanups if the future use
of a site is likely to be industrial rather than residential. I2
The environmental justice movement has raised serious concerns
about whether redevelopment of brownfield sites leads predominantly
minority inner-city communities to accept disproportionately higher health
risks in exchange for the possibility of jobs and economic development. 13
Programs allowing less stringent cleanups of brownfield sites may disproportionately affect minority and low-income populations because
most brownfields are concentrated in predominantly minority and lowerincome inner-city neighborhoods. 14 Proponents of brownfields argue that
redevelopment usually improves both the economic condition and public
health of surrounding communities. 15
State voluntary cleanup statutes may violate Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,16 which forbids discrimination by programs receiving
federal financial assistance. 17 In February 1998, EPA promulgated a controversial "Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative
Complaints Challenging Permits" ("Interim Guidance") to help the agency
resolve a number of pending complaints under that statute. IS Many state
representatives and industry developers fear that the Interim Guidance's

12. See BNA SUPERFUND, supra note 7, at d8 (reporting as of 1998 41 states considered future land use as a factor in determining cleanup standards).
13. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 887, 1002-03 (arguing brownfield redevelopment
"may perpetuate environmental inequities by increasing the high degree of risk that affected communities are already forced to bear"); Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and
Unequal: A Comment on the Urban Development Aspect of Brownfields Programs, 24
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1996); Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice Perspective on Superfund Reauthorization, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 565, 568-72
(1994) (arguing reduced cleanup standards for brownfield projects will increase risks to
poor and minority communities). But see Tara Bums Koch, Betting on Brownfields-Does
Florida's Brownfields Redevelopment Act Transform Liability Into Opportunity?, 28 STETSON L. REV. 171, 215-20 (1998) (arguing that the environmental justice critique that
brownfield redevelopment trades jobs for health of community is misplaced and that such
redevelopment usually improves both economic needs and public health of surrounding
communities); infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
14. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 887, 891, 1001-03; Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield
Initiatives and Environmental Justice: Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based Equity?,
13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 317, 319 (1997-98); Swanston, supra note 13, at 56872; infra notes 23, 122-128 and accompanying text.
15. See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1998) (discussing federal policy approaches to brownfields redevelopment); Grayson, supra note 10, at 4; Koch, supra note 13, at 197-200.
16. See Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 23-52 (Michael
Gerrard ed., 1999).
17. Title VI does not apply to federal programs. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16,
at 25. Nevertheless, EPA's policies for cleaning up and redeveloping brownfield sites may
indirectly affect how the agency evaluates whether similar state programs violate Title VI.
18. U.S. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE];
Cheryl Hogue, EPA Issues Guidance for Investigating Claims That State, Local Permits
Are Discriminatory, 66 U.S.L.W. (BNA), at 2504 (Feb. 24, 1998) [hereinafter Hogue, EPA
Issues]; Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 40-45.
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broad and vague definition of what constitutes a disparate impact will
discourage brownfield redevelopment projects. 19 So far, however, no citizen has filed a Title VI complaint against a brownfield project.20
Despite the current absence of Title VI complaints against brownfield projects, EPA is seeking to revise its Title VI policies to reduce the
possibility that such complaints could hinder redevelopment efforts.
Furthermore, EPA is also working to develop a memorandum of understanding with brownfield developers to create a sustainable redevelopment process that addresses environmental quality and equity issues. 21
Nevertheless, EPA's Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee observed in its March 1, 1999 report that its members disagreed about
whether the economic benefits of brownfield redevelopment outweighed
its possible adverse health impacts in minority communities.22
While there is considerable uncertainty about how EPA will enforce
Title VI, there are reasons to believe that state brownfield programs may
violate the statute. First, state brownfield programs are likely to approve
individual projects that disproportionately affect minority groups because
the programs fail to address disproportionate or cumulative impacts. Second, state brownfield programs are systemically flawed because they often allow lower health standards in industrial or nonresidential areas. Because minorities are more likely to live in nonresidential or industrial
areas,23 state brownfield statutes or regulations disproportionately increase health risks to minority groups.
EPA is currently revising its Title VI policy, but states can and
should adopt three reforms now to prevent their brownfield programs
from causing disparate impacts, thereby avoiding potential Title VI
claims. First, states should amend their voluntary action programs to require developers to collect data about the racial demographics and rela-

19. See Stephen C. Jones & Annop G. Shroff, Balancing Growth and the Environment: Environmental Justice Concerns Delay Industrial Expansion, 13 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY, No.5, 1 (1997) (arguing EPA's environmental justice and Title
VI policies threaten to undermine its brownfield policies); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at
4~; Environmental Justice Policy to Hurt Brownjields, SupeTj'und Revitalization, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Oct. 5,1998; infra notes 253-257 and accompanying text.
20. See EPA Defends Environmental Justice Policy, Process to Bliley, ENVTL. POL'y
ALERT, Dec. 30,1998, at 30-31.
21. See EPA, Stakeholder Group to Launch New Brownjields Redevelopment Program, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Mar. 24, 1999, at 9.
22. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 19-20.
23. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land
Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 80-89 (1998) (study of 31 census tracts in seven
cities nationwide found that industrial and commercial zoning is more common in lowincome, high-minority neighborhoods than in high-income, low-minority neighborhoods);
see also Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND
THE AMERICAN DREAM 101, 102-20 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1990)
(presenting case studies of "expulsive zoning" where cities from 1917 through at least
1930s re-zoned minority residential areas to allow intensive industrial or commercial use,
often with intent to reduce minority populations).
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tive burden of pollution in several neighborhoods surrounding brownfield
projects. States should require developers to consider whether their project will ·cause adverse disparate impacts against a minority group. Furthermore, states should require developers to examine mitigation measures and to determine whether less discriminatory or environmentally
damaging alternatives exist.
Nevertheless, developers should have the opportunity to justify a
project that has some disparate impacts by showing that the benefits exceed the costs and that alternative sites are not available. Title VI need
not interfere with legitimate redevelopment of brownfield sites as long as
such projects reasonably address the health and economic needs of all
members of a community.24
Finally, states should establish procedures for early and meaningful
public participation in their decision-making process for approving
brownfield projects. While those with the most knowledge, wealth, and
political resources are best able to utilize opportunities for public participation, even the poorest and weakest members of society have a better
opportunity to influence environmental decision-making if there are efforts to encourage participation by a diverse and broad segment of the
public. Unfortunately, most state brownfield programs restrict public
participation in the approval process. 25
EPA should reward states that adopt these reforms by giving greater
deference to their decisions, including expediting review of possible civil
rights complaints and imposing lesser penalties if a well-intentioned state
occasionally makes poor decisions. For example, when the agency evaluates a Title VI complaint against a state or local government, EPA should
take into account whether the state or local government considered community views about a project's risks and benefits to different subpopulation groups. However, the agency should not automatically defer to states
without examining whether their reforms are actually effective. Furthermore, the mere opportunity for public participation in a state program is
not enough to warrant EPA giving deference to a state's decision-making.
A state or local agency must show that it seriously considered public
comments about a proposed project's economic benefits and the possibility of less discriminatory alternatives to be entitled to a measure of deference from EPA.
EPA has recognized that the ultimate goal of brownfield redevelopment projects is to create sustainable projects that benefit a community
24. See Leslie Goff-Sanders, Brownfield Legislation: A Viable Option for the Southeast, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 141, 146 (1996-97) ("So long as state legislatures
avoid implementing cleanup standards that are too relaxed in urban areas, the revitalization
of the urban areas should please both environmental justice advocates and urban redevelopment advocates."); Grayson, supra note 10, at 4. See generally Johnson, supra note 4, at
96-97.
25. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 11, at 159-60.
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over the long-run and that do not result in the reversion of the property to
brownfield status in the future. 26 The proposed reforms would promote
sustainable brownfield projects that are reasonably safe and provide longterm benefits to a diverse range of community groups.
Part II of this Article will explain how state and federal liability
provisions inhibit redevelopment of brownfields. Part III will discuss the
common and varying features of state voluntary action programs. Part IV
will explain environmental justice concerns about brownfields. Part V
will provide a brief overview of Title VI. Part VI will examine whether
state voluntary cleanup statutes violate Title VI. Part vn will make several recommendations for creating state brownfield programs that do not
violate Title VI.
II.

BROWNFIELDS AND REDEVELOPMENT

A. Brownfields
1. Defining Brownfields

Most commentators define a brownfield site as abandoned or
underused former industrial land that is difficult to redevelop because of
existing or possible environmental contamination. 27 Developers usually
seek to redevelop such properties if they have only a small to moderate
amount of contamination. 28 Such less contaminated sites include former
industrial facilities, warehouses, gas stations, and dry cleaners.29 Most
brownfields are located in inner-city neighborhoods that were centers of
industry in the past. 30 These areas now contain predominantly minority
and lower-income populations.31 Since the 1940s, industry has shifted to
"greenfield" locations in the suburbs, which are predominantly white.32
Although the precise number of sites remains unknown, estimates
range from tens of thousands to half a million sites; it could cost as much
as $650 billion to clean up all of these properties.33
26. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, A SusTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS MODEL FRAMEWORK, i, viii, 3-4, 46, 113, EPA-500-R-99-001
(Jan. 1999) [hereinafter EPA, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS].
27. See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and lnstitlltional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. I, 3-4 (1997); Eisen, supra
note 4, at 890-91; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 707 n.3.
28. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 901; Johnson, supra note 4, at 94.
29. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 890-91.
30. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2-3; Eisen, supra note 4, at 89091; see also Buzbee, supra note 27, at 10-11.
31. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 891; see also Buzbee, supra note 27, at II.
32. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 891-92; Johnson, supra note 4, at 95; McWilliams,
supra note 4, at 717-22.
33. See, e.g., Brownfield Redevelopment: Hearings on S. 8 Before the Comm.

011
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2. Advantages of Redeveloping Brownfields
Abandoned brownfield sites often pose significant economic burdens and health risks to surrounding communities.34 Abandoned sites do
not provide jobs and yield lower property tax revenues. 35 In addition, vacant sites may be magnets for crime and encourage illegal dumping that
worsens environmental contamination at the facility.36 The presence of
vacant property also may discourage economic development. 37 Finally,
such sites may contain environmental contamination that can spread to
surrounding property.38
Redeveloping brownfield sites offers several advantages. Redevelopment of these sites can create new jobs, provide property tax revenues,
and eliminate existing environmental contamination.39 In addition, brownfield redevelopment avoids the often substantial environmental costs of exploiting "greenfield" locations 40 because brownfield areas usually already
contain infrastructure such as roads, railroads, water, and sewer systems.41 By contrast, developing a greenfield often requires developers to
build infrastructure, imposing substantial new costs on the environment.42

Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Congo (Mar. 4,1997) (Prepared Testimony of Timothy Fields,
Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S.
EPA) (reporting that best available estimate is that 450,000 brownfields exist); Davis &
Margolis, supra note 4, at 6 (estimating 130,000 to 450,000 contaminated sites); Barbara
Ruben, ENVTL. ACTION, Jan. 1, 1995, at 12 (reporting 130,000 to 425,000 brownfield sites).
34. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2-3; Hawley, supra note 8, at
1017-18; Eric D. Madden, Comment, The Volulltary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment
Act-The Limits of the Kansas Brownfield Law, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 593 (1998).
35. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2-3; Madden, supra note 34, at
595; Sarah Rubenstein, Comment, CERCLA's Contribution to the Federal Brow1ljields Problem: A Proposalfor Federal Reform, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 149,150 (1996-97).
36. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2; Davis & Margolis, supra note 4,
at 6-7; Jacobs, supra note 5, at 266-67; Madden, supra note 34, at 595-96.
37. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2; Davis & Margolis, supra note 4,
at 6-7.
38. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2; Davis & Margolis, supra note 4,
at 6-7; Madden, supra note 34, at 595-96.
39. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 894-95; see also McWilliams, supra note 4, at 710,
714-17; infra notes 194-195 and accompanying text.
40. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 890-91, 895-96 (avoiding brownfield redevelopment
will likely spread industrial pollution to greenfields); McWilliams, supra note 4, at 71722, 725 (greenfield development often damages the environment and usually shifts jobs
from cities to suburbs); Ruben, supra note 33, at 12 (quoting EPA Administrator Carol
Browner).
41. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 896-97. See generally McWilliams, supra note 4, at
717-22,725.
42. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 95; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 717-22, 725;
Madden, supra note 34, at 596.
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B. Federal and State Liability

The fear of both state and federal environmental liability discourages brownfield redevelopment. 43
1. Federal Liability

a. CERCLA
The greatest risk of liability arises under the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),
which classifies past and present property owners of any site contaminated with a "hazardous substance" as potentially responsible parties that
are subject to strict, joint, several, and retroactive liability.44 Prospective
purchasers of contaminated property are likely to be subject to full liability for all past contamination unless they negotiate an agreement with
EPA before buying the site. 45 Under CERCLA and similar state statutes,
the property owner or facility operator may be liable for past contamination at a site even if they did not cause that contamination.46 Since prospective purchasers of contaminated property are generally liable under
CERCLA for cleaning up any past contamination, the cost of cleanup
strongly discourages purchasers.47 Cleanup costs can range from tens of
thousands to millions of dollars and can easily exceed the value of the
contaminated property.48
In some circumstances, Congress or EPA has limited liability under
CERCLA. For instance, an "innocent" purchaser who had no reason to
know that contamination existed at a site is free from liability, but only if
the purchaser conducted an appropriate environmental audit that found
no hazardous substances. 49 Few owners have qualified for this defense.
Additionally, in 1996, Congress enacted legislation providing qualified
43. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 898-912; Johnson, supra note 4, at 97-98; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 725-27; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 113-14.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I)-(4) (1994) (defining liability of past and present owners
of properties or vessels contaminated with hazardous substances, as well as transporters
and those who arranged for disposal); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 269-70 (discussing joint and
several liability under CERCLA).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (defining liability of past and
present owners of properties or vessels contaminated with hazardous substances); see also
BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 5-6; Jacobs, supra note 5, at 269-70; Johnson,
supra note 4, at 98-99 (discussing joint and several liability under CERCLA).
46. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 901-05; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 725-27.
47. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 904-05; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 727-28.
48. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 8; Hawley, supra note 8, at 1021; see also Rubenstein, supra note 35, at 161-63 (discussing uncertain and expensive costs of cleanups under CERCLA).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), (B) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Brian C. Walsh,
Seeding the Brownfields: A Proposed Statute Limiting Environmental Liability for Prospective Purchasers, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 196-97 (1997).
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liability protection for lenders who do not become involved in the management of a facility to encourage lenders to finance development of possibly contaminated properties.50
When prospective purchasers seek to buy contaminated property, EPA
will sometimes limit liability through a prospective purchaser agreementY
The agency's 1989 policy regarding prospective purchaser agreements
was extremely restrictive. To qualify for limited liability, a developer had
to provide the agency with a "substantial benefit" by either performing
cleanup work itself or reimbursing the agency for its response costS.52
In 1995, EPA issued a revised prospective purchaser guidance that is
more sympathetic toward developers. 53 The 1995 guidance expands the
coverage of these agreements beyond sites where EPA enforcement action is expected, and includes properties where there has already been
federal involvement. In addition, the 1995 guidance relaxes the "substantial benefit" requirement to include not only direct monetary and cleanup
benefits, but also indirect public benefits in combination with a reduced
direct benefit to EPA.54 Yet, the 1995 guidance is still limited to the small
minority of contaminated sites with which EPA is involved and does not
address the larger number of sites that are wholly within the jurisdiction
of state or local governments.55
Prior to the publication of the 1995 guidance, EPA had entered into
only twenty agreements, but in the first three years under the 1995 policy
the agency referred eighty additional agreements to the Department of
Justice, including seventy final agreements.56 Nevertheless, the 1995
policy is fairly restrictive because the purchaser could be liable for contamination unknown at the time an agreement is signed, and these
agreements are limited to purchasers of National Priorities List ("NPL")
sites57 or properties where EPA anticipates enforcement action. 58 A final
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994 & Supp. ill 1997) ("The term 'owner or operator' ... does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel
or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel
or facility."); id. § 9601(20)(E) (limiting lender liability); Buzbee, supra note 27, at 14.
51. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995); Johnson, supra note 4, at 108-09; Walsh, supra note 49, at 205-07.
52. Superfund Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241-42 (1989); Eisen, supra note
4, at 983; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 744-45.
53. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,792; Walsh,
supra note 49, at 205-07.
54. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,794.
55. See id. at 34, 793.
56. See SUPERFUND REFORMS, supra note 5, at 16.
57. NPL sites are often referred to as Superfund sites because the agency may only
spend special tax funds placed in the Superfund trust on such sites. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a)(8) (1994); 40 C.ER. § 300.3 (1998) (stating cleanups of NPL sites must follow
National Contingency Plan); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 267-68.
58. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated
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restriction on the purchaser agreements is that the Department of Justice's Assistant Attorney General must provide "concurrence" of every
prospective purchaser agreement. 59
Accordingly, there is no broad protection yet for brownfield developers. For potential brownfield redevelopers, the threat of CERCLA liability creates huge obstacles because the costs of remediating a site are
often uncertain and there are often significant delays before a cleanup
can be approved by state or federal officials. 60 Furthermore, if contamination is found in the future, nothing protects the developer from additionalliability.61
While the threat of CERCLA liability obstructs developers from redeveloping contaminated sites, not all brownfields are subject to stringent
federal cleanup rules. EPA focuses on the worst sites and gives states
primary jurisdiction over less contaminated properties. EPA uses a numerical scoring system, the Hazard Ranking System ("HRS"),62 to place
the most contaminated sites on the NPL.63 The agency's main focus is on
remediating the approximately 1300 sites on the NPL.64 However, the
agency has recently shifted its focus to smaller brownfield sites because
it has completed many Superfund c1eanups.65 The agency has jurisdiction
over any site that contains a "hazardous substance," which includes virtually all toxic substances and chemicals except petroleum. 66 The agency
also keeps a list of several thousand potential Superfund sites on its
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Information System ("CERCLIS") database, but has deleted over 30,000
sites, about seventy-five percent of the 42,000 sites, from that list be-

Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,792; Eisen, sllpra
note 4, at 983-84; see also Wendy Wagner, Overview of Federal and State Law Governing
Brownjields Cleanups, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 15, 25-26 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997).
59. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,795 (1995).
60. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 901,906-10; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 110.
61. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 910-11; Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmelltal Liability
and the Brownjields Phenomenon: An Analysis of Federal Options for Redevelopment, 10
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 93-94 (1996).
62. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c)(I) (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(c)(I),
9605(g)(2)(B) (1994); Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evollltion of BrolVnjields, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y 'REV. 265, 270-71 (1997) (discussing Hazard Ranking
System).
63. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9605(a)(8), 9605(c), 9611 (1994) (Superfund);
40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1998); Wagner, supra note 58, at 16-17; Wernstedt & Hersh, sllpra note
II, at 156.
64. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2 (EPA has identified about 1300
high-priority NPL sites); see also BNA SUPERFUND, supra note 7, at d8 (indicating that as
of 1998, EPA had listed about 1,300 NPL sites and was planning to add approximately 200
more in the next two years).
65. See Greene, supra note 9, at 10.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994) (defining the term "hazardous substance"); 40
C.F.R. § 302.4 (1998) (same).
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cause the agency realizes that the stigma and cleanup uncertainties associated with such a listing may discourage redevelopment. 67
Developers normally avoid heavily contaminated sites on EPA's Superfund or CERCLIS lists because the agency's complicated rules for
cleaning up such sites makes it very expensive to redevelop them and many
states prohibit voluntary cleanups of federal NPL sites. 68 Still, there are
tens of thousands of potential brownfield sites that contain a small to moderate amount of contamination and are primarily under state jurisdiction. 69
b. Limiting Federal Liability

While states cannot limit federal liability without EPA approvaVo
EPA has cautiously moved to give states greater authority to set cleanup
standards. Traditionally, EPA officials have been reluctant to cede final
cleanup authority to states or to spend administrative resources reviewing
state agreements with developers.71 However, to facilitate brownfields
redevelopment, EPA can issue a comfort/status letter (i.e., a "No Current
Federal Superfund Interest Letter") to a developer or a "State Action
Letter" to a state. These letters are issued when the agency does not intend to exercise its CERCLA jurisdiction because the owner is cooperating with state authorities in performing a cleanup. Such letters are not
binding on the agency.72 The agency has issued at least 300 comfort/status letters.73
Furthermore, in 1997, EPA issued a final draft guidance that encouraged state voluntary cleanup programs by allowing the agency to enter
into an agreement with a state. The agency agreed not to exercise its
CERCLA cleanup authority at low-risk sites undergoing a voluntary
cleanup according to state rules approved in the agreement.14 The agency
67. See SUPERFUND REFORMS, supra note 5, at 2,15.
68. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(I) (West 1998); FLA. STAT.
ch. 376.82(1) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.02 (West 1999); see Eisen, supra note
4, at 923 (stating that most states prohibit voluntary cleanups of federal NPL sites); Johnson, supra note 4, at 94, 98 (noting that most developers do not consider NPL sites to fit
the definition of "brownfield"); Hawley, supra note 8, at 1039-40.
69. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 901-02.
70. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 15-16; Johnson, supra note 4, at 105-06; Walsh,
supra note 49, at 210.
71. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 15-16.
72. See Policy on the Issuance of Comfort/Status Letters, 62 Fed. Reg. 4624 (1997);
Jacobs, supra note 5, at 275; Frona M. Powell, Amending CERCLA to Encourage the Redevelopmellt of Brownfields: Issues, Concerns, and Recommendations, 53 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 113, 126-27 (1998) (discussing "comfort letters" for prospective
brownfield purchasers).
73. See SUPERFUND REFORMS, supra note 5, at 17.
74. See Notice of the Availability of Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) Language Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,495 (1997); Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings on S. 8 Before
the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Congo (1997) (statement of Carol
Browner, U.S. EPA Administrator); Koch, supra note 13, at 209 (describing Florida's ef-
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reached such memoranda of agreement ("MOA") with eleven states. 7S
However, in late 1997, the agency withdrew that final draft guidance because of conflicting public comments on revising it, but left the eleven
existing MOAs in effect.76 Even where EPA has not entered into an
agreement with a state, the agency is unlikely to reopen a state-approved
voluntary cleanup.77
2. State Liability
Brownfield developers are subject to state liability as well as federal
liability, but states often are willing to limit state liability for legitimate
brownfield redevelopment projects. At least forty-five states have enacted
hazardous waste statutes that may raise additional liability issues for developers because CERCLA does not preempt parallel or more stringent
state hazardous waste and cleanup laws.7s Many state "mini-CERCLA"
laws also apply expansive, strict, joint and several liability on both present and past property owners.79

III.

STATE VOLUNTARY ACTION PROGRAMS

Most states have enacted legislation or promulgated regulations that
encourage developers voluntarily to clean up contaminated properties. 80
While federal programs have had some effect in encouraging brownfield
redevelopment, state voluntary action programs have had far more impact
for two reasons. SI First, most sites fall under state jurisdiction because
forts to negotiate a MOA with EPA).
75. See BNA Superfund, supra note 6, at d8 (reporting statement of Earl Salo, EPA's
assistant general counsel for Superfund).
76. See Memorandum from Timothy Fields, Acting Assistant Administrator, Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, & Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, EPA's Office of Compliance Assurance, to EPA Regional Administrators,
Withdrawal of Proposal: Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memoranda of
Agreement Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs (Nov. 26, 1997) (on file with
Harvard Environmental Law Review); Eisen, supra note 1, at 207-12.
77. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 16.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1994) (stating that CERCLA does not preempt state
law); id. § 9614(b) (clarifying that multiple recovery of same costs not allowed under both
state and federal law); see also 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5122-2 (West 1998); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 21E, §§ 1-18 (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-31O to 130A-31O.13 (1999);
Abrams, supra note 62, at 267-68 (noting that at least 45 states have statutes similar to
CERCLA).
79. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 376.30-.319 (1997); IOWA CODE § 455B.381-.399
(1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:l to B:15 (1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 6020.101-.1305 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-6 to -7 (1996). Em see TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-212-207(A)-(B) (1996) (mandating that courts examine fault as well as
equitable factors in apportioning liability); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-31O(2)(g) (1998)
(rejecting explicitly joint-and-severalliability).
80. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 915-27; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 121-23.
81. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 914-15.
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EPA focuses on NPL or CERCLIS sites, which are only a small percentage of all contaminated properties. 82 Second, states have generally been
far more willing than EPA to accept cleanups that only reduce contamination to levels safe for industrial use. 83
A. Common Elements in State Brownfield Programs

There are common elements in most state brownfield programs. 84
First, all are voluntary and do not require property owners to join.85 Second, most states prohibit voluntary cleanups of federal NPL sites. 86 Third,
state voluntary action statutes and programs generally streamline the
cleanup approval process. 87 Most importantly, state voluntary action statutes and programs usually set forth statewide cleanup standards that allow for higher levels of risk than the Superfund program if a site will be
used for commercial or industrial rather than residential purposes. 88 Finally, voluntary action statutes and programs typically limit a developer's
liability against state enforcement actions 89 through (1) "no action" letters, which indicate that a state probably will not pursue further enforcement actions unless new information about contamination is discovered;90
(2) covenants not to sue, which provide express protection that a state
will not pursue further enforcement actions;91 (3) releases from state
CERCLA liability;92 and (4) certificates of completion indicating that a
cleanup meets applicable state standards. 93

B. Three Types of State Voluntary Cleanup Statutes
States have adopted a variety of different cleanup standards to encourage voluntary cleanups, but they generally fall into three major cate82. See id. at 923 (indicating that most states prohibit voluntary cleanups of federal
NPL sites); Sweeney, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.329 (listing California, Colorado, Montana, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania statutes as specifically prohibiting voluntary
cleanups offederal NPL sites); supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
83. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 909-10.
84. See id. at 915-27.
85. See id. at 920.
86. See id. at 923; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.329 (listing California, Colorado, Montana, New York, Ohio as specifically prohibiting voluntary cleanups of federal
NPL sites); Madden, supra note 34, at 612-13 (stating that Kansas excludes NPL sites
from its voluntary action program).
87. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 920.
88. See id. at 920, 936-49.
89. See id. at 921,950-65.
90. See id. at 952-54.
91. See id. at 955-56; Johnson, supra note 4, at 102; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 163.
92. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 957-58.
93. See id. at 956-57; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 163.
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gories: (1) background standards; (2) model state-approved generic riskbased cleanup standards; and (3) site-specific standards. 94 Some states
allow developers considerable freedom in choosing among these three
approaches. 95
1. Background Standards

A background standard is usually the most stringent approach because it requires a developer to reduce the level of contamination to the
conditions present at the site before the contamination occurred. 96 Some
states do not allow institutional controls, which include physical barriers
such as fencing, or legal restrictions on future land use to meet background standards, although they may be used to maintain them after a
cleanup.97 Perhaps because of a fear that meeting background standards
may be very expensive, some states treat background standards as an option for a developer to select, but do not require that they must be met. 98
Some states define background levels of contamination in terms of
the generally prevailing levels in the surrounding area. 99 In Illinois, the
94. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-8.5 (West 1997) (providing a three-tier
system for cleanup levels: (1) "background" levels; (2) site-specific, risk-based standard
depending upon future use of the site; (3) either background levels or generic risk-based
standards using statewide standards developed by state department of environmental protection); IOWA CODE § 455H.201 (1999) (providing three types of cleanup standards:
(1) "background" standards; (2) statewide standards; and (3) site-specific standards): Thomas G. Kessler, The Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act: Pe/l11sylvania Tells CERCLA Enough Is Enough, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 184-94 (1997) (discussing Pennsylvania's three cleanup standards: (1) background levels; (2) statewide health
standards; and (3) site-specific standards).
95. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(1)-(2) (West 1998); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 3746-300-08 to -09 (1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.301,
6026.303, 6026.304 (West 1999); see also Eisen, supra note 4, at 948.
96. See IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-8.5(b)(I) (West 1997) (defining "background
levels" as the level of "hazardous substances that occur naturally on the site"); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.103 (West 1999) (defining "background" standards as "[t]he concentration of a regulated substance determined by appropriate statistical methods that is present at the site, but is not related to the release of regulated substances at the site"); James
W. Creenan & John Q. Lewis, Pennsylvania's Land Recycling Program: Solving the
Brownfields Problem with Remediation Standards and Limited Liability, 34 DUQ. L. REV.
661, 677-79 (1996) (discussing the definition of "background standards" under Pennsylvania statute); Alexander H. Tynberg, Oregon's New Cleanup Law: Short-Term Thinking at
the Expense of Long-Term Environmental and Economic Prosperity, 12 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 471, 474 (1997) (defining "background" levels).
97. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(b)(4) (West 1999); Steven F. Fairlie, The
New Greenfields Legislation: A Practitioner's Guide to Recycling Old Industrial Sites, 5
DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 77, 84 n.43 (1996).
98. See IOWA CODE § 455H.201 (1999) (allowing developer to choose "background"
standards as an option); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 7-508(b)(3) (1998) (participant in voluntary cleanup has option to select background levels as cleanup standard); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302 (c) (West 1999).
99. See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5158.2 (West 1998) (defining "area background"
standard), id. 5158.5(b)(l) (remediation must achieve "area background levels" unless
exception applies); 35 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 742.400-.415 (1996) (regulations for
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"area background" standard explicitly includes not only background levels naturally present in the soil, but also contamination from areawide
releases outside the site. loo Accordingly, in Illinois, the area background
standard in a heavily industrial or commercial location is likely to be less
protective of human health and the environment than in a primarily residential neighborhood. 101 Illinois explicitly recognizes that a cleanup to
area background levels may not be sufficiently safe to permit future residential development or may even pose "an acute threat to human
health."I02
Some proponents of environmental justice argue that all properties
should meet rigorous background standards to avoid the possibility of
harm to minority communities.103 Developers respond that a rigorous
background cleanup standard may not make sense if a permanent cleanup
is impractical or the costs exceed the benefits. For instance, it may be
impractical to "pump and treat" contaminated groundwater on a site if
the surrounding aquifer is contaminated and will re-contaminate the
groundwater. 104

determining "area background" concentrations for contaminants of concern at site); David
L. Reiser, A Practical Approach to Brownfields: An Overview of TACO and the SRP, 86
ILL. B.J. 262, 264-65 (1998) (discussing illinois' "area background" standards); see also
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(b)(I) (West 1999) (listing criteria for attainment of the
background standard); Kessler, supra note 94, at 187-88 (discussing Pennsylvania's background standards).
100. See 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/58.2 (West 1998) (defining "area background" to
refer to regulated substances "consistently present in the environment in the vicinity of a
site that are the result of natural conditions or human activities, and not the result solely of
releases at the site."); id. § 5/58.5(b)(I) (remediation must achieve "area background levels" unless exception applies); 35 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 742.400-.415 (1996) (regulations for determining "area background" concentrations for contaminants of concern at
site); David L. Reiser, Brownfields Bill Promotes Sweeping Changes, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
621, 626-27 (1996) (Illinois allows use of "area background" standards that take into account areawide releases outside the site and thus allows lesser cleanups in industrial areas
as long as contamination does not pose an acute risk to workers on the site).
101. 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/58.2 (West 1998) (defining "area background" standards), id. § 5/58.5(b)(1) (remediation must achieve "area background levels" unless exception applies); 35 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 742.400-.415 (1996) (regulations for determining "area background" concentrations for contaminants of concern at site); Reiser,
Brownfield Bill Promotes Sweeping Changes, supra note 100.
102. 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/58.5(b)(3) (West 1998); see also 415 ILL. COMPo
STAT. § 5/58.5 (b)(2) (if concentration of regulated substance of concern does not meet
residential standards, property may not be used for residential use in the future unless it
undergoes further cleanup); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, §§ 742.4l5(c)-(d) (1996) (area
background standard may not be used if it would pose acute health risk); Reiser, Brownfield Bill Promotes Sweeping Changes, supra note 100 (reporting lllinois' "area background" standards allow lesser cleanups in industrial areas as long as contamination does
not pose an acute risk to workers on the site).
103. See Tynberg, Sllpra note 96, at 476 ("Because there is a significant disparate
correlation between industrial contamination and its occurrences in low-income minority
communities, the most socially appropriate remedy may be to force cleanup of a site to
background levels.").
104. See 40 C.P.R. § 300.430(a)(I)(iii)(F) (1998) (when restoration of groundwater
is not practicable, cleanup plan may use measures to prevent further migration of contami-
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2. Model State-Approved Generic Risk-Based Cleanup Standards

Model state-approved generic risk-based cleanup standards set numerical standards for acceptable cancer risk. 105 While numerical risk
standards may appear to be precise, states vary widely with respect to the
assumptions used to measure the risk. For example, Pennsylvania does
not consider the impact of institutional controls, such as fencing and future land use restrictions, in determining whether a developer has met
statewide health standards, but does consider them after an initial cleanup
to determine if the standards are maintained. 106 Other states establish
separate statewide health standards for residential and nonresidential
uses, allowing higher levels of contamination at commercial or industrial
sites. 107 A state may allow a greater risk level for nonresidential sites.
Alternatively, a state may set the same risk level for all sites, but allow
more contamination at an industrial site based on the assumption that
human beings are much less likely to be exposed at such a site than a
residential site. lOS These differential standards raise questions about

nation); Jonathan S. Kannel, TItle 5 of New York's Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act
Authorizes Risk Assessment to Clean up Brownfields, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 469, 477-78
(1997).
105. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 13-25-5-8.5(d)(I) (1998) (providing generic risk-based
standards using statewide standards developed by state Department of Environmental Protection); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(1) (West 1998); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745300-08 (1998) (generic numerical standards based upon intended use of property after
voluntary cleanup); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303 (West 1999) (establishing cleanup
requirements to meet statewide health standards under regulations adopted by state Environmental Quality Board); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 284 (discussing Ohio's generic and
property-specific risk assessment procedures); id. at 291-94 (discussing Pennsylvania's
generic and property-specific risk assessment procedures); Kessler, supra note 94, at 18890 (discussing Pennsylvania's health-based standards).
106. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(e)(3) (West 1999); Fairlie, supra note
96, at 84 n.43.
107. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133k(a)(3) (1997) (Commissioner of Environmental Protection may set more stringent cleanup standards for residential than historically
industrial or commercial property); 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/58.5(d) (West 1998) (requiring
one-in-a-million cancer risk for residential uses in "Tiers I and II;' but only one-in-tenthousand for commercial and industrial uses in "Tier III"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3746.04(B)(I) (West 1998); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-08(A)(2) (1998); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.305 (West 1999) (establishing less stringent cleanup standards for
special industrial sites that have no financially viable responsible person to remediate them
or are located in an "enterprise zone"); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 284 (discussing Ohio's
generic and property-specific risk assessment standards for nonresidential and residential
properties); id. at 291-96 (discussing Pennsylvania's generic and property-specific risk
assessment standards for nonresidential and residential properties). But see WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 173-340-740(1), -745 (1997) (requiring presumption of residential cleanup standards unless site meets specific industrial use criteria).
108. See Michael L. Gargas & Thomas F. Long, The Role of Risk Assessment in Redeveloping Brownfield Sites, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, at 214, 229-32, 242-45 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D.
Margolis eds., 1997) (discussing differences in human and ecological exposure assumptions for plausible future-use scenarios).
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whether particular population groups living near commercial or industrial
areas will be disproportionately impacted.
3. Site-Specific Standards

Site-specific standards are based upon an individualized risk assessment that considers the future use of a property (i.e., commercial,
industrial, or residential).I09 A site-specific plan may allow for limited
treatment of contamination in conjunction with the use of institutional
and engineering controls to contain any remaining contamination. 110 An
increasing number of cleanups are applying site-specific approaches, but
the expense of conducting such a risk assessment may make that method
inappropriate for some developers. 1l1

C. Do Future Use Provisions and Institutional Controls Lower Cleanup
Standards and Raise Health Concerns?
A controversial issue is whether EPA or states should consider the
future use of a site, and allow lower cleanup standards if a site will be
used for industrial or commercial uses rather than residential purposes.
To guarantee long-term protection of public health and the environment,
CERCLA explicitly prefers permanent treatment remedies that destroy
hazardous chemicals rather than simply contain them with clay liners or
other protective barriers.1l2 Additionally, in evaluating risks at Superfund
109. See IND. CODE § 13-25-5-8.5(b)(2) (1998) (allowing site-specific, risk-based
standard depending upon future use of the site); IOWA CODE § 455H.204 (1999) (providing
site-specific cleanup standards); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 7-508(b)(2) (1998) (participant
in voluntary cleanup may select cleanup standard based on site-specific risk assessment);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304 (West 1999) (state may approve voluntary cleanup
based upon site-specific risk assessment); VA. CODE ANN. § 1O.1-1429.1(A)(I) (Michie
1998) (state may issue regulations allowing voluntary cleanup based upon site-specific risk
assessment); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 284 (discussing Ohio's site-specific standards); id. at
293-94 (discussing Pennsylvania's site-specific standards); Sweeney, supra note 4, at 15455 (discussing Pennsylvania's site-specific standards); Koch, supra note 13, at 200-01
(discussing Florida's site-specific standards); Kessler, supra note 94, at 190-94 (discussing
Pennsylvania's site-specific standards).
110. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(i) (West 1999) (site-specific response
action may consist "solely of fences, warning signs or future land use restrictions" only if
such institutional controls would satisfy land use law applicable at time site was contaminated); Creenan & Lewis, supra note 96, at 684-85.
111. See Abbi L. Cohen, Voluntary Remediation Programs, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Apr. 2,1997, at 11.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(I) (1994); Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 146 (1996); Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of Institutional
Controls in Superfund and Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1995)
(discussing EPA's preference for treatment over engineering and institutional controls);
Powell, supra note 72, at 117; Rimer, supra note 61, at 90; Krista J. Ayers, Comment, The
Potential for Future Use Analysis in Superfund Remediation Programs, 44 EMORY L.J.
1503, 1503-05 (1995).
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sites, EPA has usually employed a conservative, protective "reasonable
maximum exposure" approach that assumes a site would be used for
residential purposes and will be a significant source of drinking water
even if it currently is used for industrial or commercial purposes.1I3 As a
result, for many years EPA strongly preferred permanent treatment to
residential levels instead of remedies that contained existing contamination to industrial or commercial safety levels by employing institutional
and engineering controls, such as capping and fencing the site, posting
signs, monitoring and limiting use of groundwater, deed restrictions,
zoning requirements, or restrictive covenants or easements.1I4 EPA's National Contingency Plan regulations for Superfund cleanups, however,
recognize that permanent treatment may be impractical in some circumstances and therefore authorize engineering or institutional controls, such
as containment, in appropriate cases.l15 Thus, EPA will consider a site's
future use in determining the appropriate remedy under CERCLA.1I6
Proponents of brownfield redevelopment argue that EPA and states
should consider whether a site's future use is most likely to be industrial
or commercial to avoid unnecessarily expensive c1eanups.117 Brownfield
developers argue that residential exposure assumptions should be used
only when residential use and the exposure of children is likely.1I8 Assuming a site will be used for residential purposes rather than industrial
uses may increase risk estimates by up to a thousand times. 1I9 Even if the
113. See James H. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Reglllatory Refomls for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 165 (1997) (EPA uses "reasonable
maximum exposure" to assess risk of Superfund sites); Alex Karlin, How Long is Clean?:
The Temporal Dimension to Protecting Human Health Under SlIperfllnd, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 6, 47 (1994).
114. See Rimer, sllpra note 61, at 90-92; Borinsky, sllpra note 112, at 8-10 (discussing EPA's preference for treatment over engineering and institutional controls). See
generally 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(B)-(D), 300.430(e)(3)(i)-(ii) (1998) (referring to
engineering and institutional controls); John Pendergrass, Use of Instillliional Comrols as
Part of a SlIperfund Remedy: Lessons From Other Programs, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L.
Inst.) 10,109 (1996); infra notes 115-116, 129-131 and accompanying text.
115. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(B)-(D) (1998) (EPA may allow engineering
controls such as containment where permanent treatment of hazardous contamination is
impractical); id. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(C)-(G) (EPA must consider risks and costs of removal
and treatment with risks and costs of less permanent cleanup approaches); Karmel, sllpra
note 104, at 477. See generally Borinsky, sllpra note 112; Pendergrass, sllpra note 114, at
10,109-10.
116. See Memorandum from Elliott P. Laws, Assistant Administrator, Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, to EPA Regional Directors, OSWER
Directive No. 9355.7-04, Land Use in the CERCLA Remedy Selection Process (May 25,
1995) (addressing consideration of future land use in remedy selection determinations
under CERCLA); Land Use Directive, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,595 (1995) (same).
117. See James H. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Hllman Health Risk Assessments for
SlIperfllnd, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 587-88 (1994) [hereinafter Hamilton & Viscusi, Hllman
Health Risk Assessment] (observing that EPA often assumes future residential use at Superfund site that has low probability of future residential use); Rimer, supra note 61, at 90-92.
118. See Gargas & Long, sllpra note 108, at 245.
119. See id. at 244-45 (discussing case study of brownfield where cleanup to residential standards would have cost $55 million, but cleanup to industrial standards only
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same risk levels are used at both residential and nonresidential sites (for
example, a one-in-a-million maximum lifetime risk of contracting cancer
from a chemical), a much higher level of contamination is usually allowed at an industrial site because of the assumption that human beings
are much less likely to be exposed at the industrial site. 120 For instance, a
realistic industrial future use scenario might assume that an adult worker
may be exposed twelve hours a day, 250 days a year, for a maximum of
thirty years. Additionally, a realistic industrial use scenario might assume
limited surface-soil contact and exposure to dusts. By contrast, a residential model might set a much more restrictive exposure limit based on
the greater vulnerability of children to substances such as lead and the
likelihood that children may ingest soil. Furthermore, some commentators maintain that EPA should strongly consider the use of less expensive
institutional and engineering controls such as land use restrictions or
physical barriers that could limit human access to a site. 121
Many environmentalists have raised concerns that government
officials will allow developers to clean up sites under less stringent industrial standards, but then later approve residential development, or that
contamination from an industrial site will migrate to residential areas. 122
While restrictive covenants or other land use restrictions should prevent
sites designated for commercial or industrial use from being used for
residential purposes, there are serious questions about who will actually
enforce such provisions in the future. l23 Furthermore, even if these sites
are only used for industrial and commercial purposes, is it fair to make
some neighborhoods "sacrifice zones"?124 Because many brownfields are
located in heavily minority, inner-city areas, proponents of environmental
justice are concerned that such sacrifice zones will disproportionately
affect minority groups.l25 Additionally, some environmentalists have
$500,000); Land-Use Planning Can Reduce Cost of Cleanup at Superfund Sites: Study,
HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Sept. 22, 1997 (reporting that a study by Peter Katsumata and
William Kastenberg found that assumption a site will be used for residential purposes
rather than industrial uses may increase risk estimates by up to three orders of magnitude).
120. See Gargas & Long, supra note 108, at 229-32, 242-45.
121. See Hamilton & Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments, supra note 117, at
608-09 (arguing institutional or engineering controls could avoid many risks currently
assumed to exist in EPA risk assessments of Superfund sites); John Pendergrass, Sustainable Redevelopment of Brownfields: Using Institutional Controls to Protect Public Health,
29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,243-48 (1999) (discussing various types of institutional controls and financing of these systems); Rimer, supra note 61, at 90-92.
122. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 706-08; Powell, supra note 72, at 132-33;
Sweeney, supra note 4, at 115-16; Wemstedt & Hersh, supra note 11, at 159-61; Rimer,
supra note 61, at 93-94.
123. See Borinsky, supra note 112, at 7; Pendergrass, supra note 121, 10,255;
Rimer, supra note 61, at 99-100.
124. Stacie A. Craddock, A Call for Public Participation in State Voluntary Remediation Programs: Strategies for Promoting Public Involvement Opportunities in Virginia,
30 U. RICH. L. REv. 499, 509 (1996).
125. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 887, 1002-03 (arguing brownfield redevelopment
"may perpetuate environmental inequities by increasing the high degree of risk that af-
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raised questions about whether industrial-use cleanups will really be less
expensive or time-consuming if the remedies truly provide long-term
protection of public health and the environment. Protecting workers from
occupational exposure to soil risks, for instance, can be very expensive. 126
There are also serious questions about whether existing land use and institutional controls will be effective because no agency has a clear oversight role to monitor their effectiveness. 127 Institutional and engineering
controls do not provide finality and, thus, require the government or a
private entity to supervise the property to assure that contamination does
not spread, especially to residential areas or sources of drinking water. 128
EPA recently has become somewhat more willing to accept cleanups
that do not meet permanent, residential cleanup standards. 129 In 1995,
EPA issued a guidance that allows the agency to consider the likely future use of a site as long as the agency consults with a wide range of interested parties about the site's likely use. 130 As a result, EPA is more
willing to consider remedies that include institutional and engineering
controls rather than permanent treatment. 131
States have been far more aggressive than EPA in allowing consideration of future use in setting cleanup standards for voluntary cleanups.
Approximately forty-one states have enacted statutes or regulations that
fected communities are already forced to bear"); Field, supra note 10, at 652; Poindexter,
supra note 13, at 37-38; Swanston, supra note 13, at 568-72 (arguing reduced cleanup
standards for brownfield projects will increase risks to poor and minority communities);
but see Koch, supra note 13, at 215-20 (arguing environmental justice critique that
brownfield redevelopment trades jobs for health of community is misplaced and that such
redevelopment usually improves both economic needs and public health of surrounding
communities).
126. See Rimer, supra note 61, at 93-94.
127. See Bradford C. Mank, Other Remedial Issues: Long-Term Monitoring, Reopeners and Cost Underestimates, in 1 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE: THE CLEANUP
AND REDEVELOPMENT OF CONTAMINATED LAND § 25.01 (Michael Gerrard ed., 1998)
[hereinafter, Mank, Other Remedial Issues] (long-term monitoring and maintenance of
engineering controls under RCRA or CERCLA can be very expensive); Ponder Land Use,
Institutional Controls When Reauthorizing Superfund: RFF, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS,
June 23, 1997 (reporting that a Resources for the Future report raised questions about effectiveness of land use and institutional controls at three National Priority List ("NPL")
sites). But see Pendergrass, supra note 121, at 10,243-48 (discussing various types of institutional controls and financing of these systems).
128. See Rimer, supra note 61, at 93-94.
129. See Ayers, supra note 112, at 1506-07, 1513-18 (noting that EPA is expanding
its consideration of future use in cleanup decisions despite CERCLA's preference for permanent cleanups); Rimer, supra note 61, at 90-92 (same).
130. See OmCE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE ("OSWER"), U.S.
EPA, LAND USE IN THE CERCLA REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS, OSWER Directive No.
9355.7-04 (May 25, 1995); Rimer, supra note 61, at 91-92; Lauri DeBrie Thanheiser, The

Allure of a Lure: Proposed Federal Land Use Restriction Easements in Remediation of
Contaminated Property, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 271, 287-88 (1997); Corrective
Action for Releases from Solid Waste Units at Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61
Fed. Reg. 19,432, 19,439, 19,452, 19,460 (1996).
131. See Rimer, supra note 61, at 90-92; supra notes 115-116 and accompanying
text.
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authorize environmental agencies to consider the future use of a site
when setting cleanup standards or approving a remedy at a specific site. 132
These states allow higher levels of contamination if a site is likely to remain commercial or industrial for the foreseeable future. To guarantee
that the future use remains industrial or commercial, states typically require the developer to impose land use restrictions and perhaps physical
engineering controls to ensure that the area does not become residential. I33
There is a middle ground between mandating permanent residential
treatment in all cases and liberally allowing industrial-level cleanups
whenever a developer seeks a less stringent cleanup. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to use lower cleanup standards at certain
industrial or commercial sites that are unlikely to be used for residential
purposes in the future and pose no risk to surrounding populations. l34
Considering a site's future use is appropriate as long as a remedy adequately protects public health and the environment.
Nevertheless, a cleanup that leaves a significant level of contamination poses risks because institutional or engineering controls can fail in

132. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398(d)(1) (West 1999) (allowing
remedy to be based on intended use of property); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133k (1999)
(remedy may consider future use if property was traditionally industrial or commercial
property); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-734(f) (1999) (voluntary cleanup plan may address
"current and reasonably anticipated future uses of the facility and immediately adjacent
properties."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-12a, -12c(l) (West 1999) (allowing remedy to be
based on intended use of property); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(I), (2) (West
1998) (allowing remedy to be based on intended use of property); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 465.315(1)(g) (1997) (allowing consideration of "current and reasonably anticipated"
future use); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(f) (1999) (site-specific remediation plan
may consider future use of site); UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R315-101-5.2(b)(2) (1996) (allowing future land use planning to be considered if potential land use is more protective
than actual land use conditions); see BNA Superfund, supra note 6, at d8 (reporting that as
of 1998 41 states consider future land use as a factor in determining cleanup standards);
infra notes 12, 107-108, 133 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.6(b)(1) (West 1999) (allowing state to approve engineering and land use controls); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-1330(b)
(1999) (requiring binding land use restrictions if cleanup is below residential levels);
MICH. COMPo LAWS § 324.20120b(2), (4) (1999) (requiring cleanups below residential
standards to include notice to land records and restrictive covenants); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10B-12g(3) (allowing state to approve engineering and institutional controls); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0503(2)(g) (McKinney 1999) (allowing Department of Environmental Conservation to approve municipal restoration project that employs engineering
and institutional controls); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.01(N), 3746.05 (West 1999)
(allowing engineering and institutional controls for complying land uses); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 6026.304(i) (1999) (noting that site-specific response action may only consist
"solely of fences, warning signs or future land use restrictions" if such institutional controls would satisfy land use law applicable at time site was contaminated); Borinsky, supra
note 112, at 24-25; Karmel, supra note 104, at 490.
134. See Gargas & Long, supra note 108, at 244-45 (discussing case study of
brownfield where cleanup to residential standards would have cost $55 million, cleanup to
industrial standards only $500,000, and industrial/commercial use scenario was far more
realistic); Karmel, supra note 104, at 479-80.
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the future. 135 Contamination from an industrial or commercial site may
migrate to an aquifer or well used for drinking water. Accordingly, an
agency should not allow a developer to rely on engineering or institutional controls if there is a significant likelihood of off-site migration or
human exposure. 136 Owners or operators of a property that is limited to
industrial or commercial use should be liable if the property is later used
for purposes that affect residential neighbors. 137 If future scientific research demonstrates a higher risk than was understood at the time of a
cleanup agreement between a developer and a government agency, the
owner should have a duty to eliminate contamination that poses substantial risks to public health and the environment. 138 However, states should
consider providing funding if unanticipated risks that could not have
been expected at the time of the initial cleanup later develop at a site.
D. Numerical Cleanup Standards: Do Relaxed Standards at Industrial or
Commercial Sites Raise Concerns?

States frequently rely on numerical cleanup standards to define acceptable risk, but these standards may fail to address the greater susceptibility of some minority groups to risks that may be acceptable to the
general population. These numerical cleanup standards also could produce disparate racial impacts because states often set a different, less
protective standard for industrial and commercial sites that may be disproportionately located near minority populations.
Numerical risk standards usually try to define the lifetime risk of
contracting cancer from a particular chemical, but they frequently fail to
reflect scientific uncertainties or the possibility that different social, ethnic, or racial groups may be more or less susceptible to certain chemical
exposures. 139 Risk-based standards are usually established by estimating
the lifetime risk that a hypothetical person will develop cancer as a result
of being subject to the reasonable maximum exposure of the facility's
chemicals from living close to the site for thirty or seventy years. 140 There
135. See Karmel, supra note 104, at 492.
136. See Ayers, supra note 112, at 1507-08.
137. See Mank, Other Remedial Issues, supra note 127, § 25.02[4][c] n.76; Ayers,
supra note 112, at 1508-09.
138. See Mank, Other Remedial Issues, supra note 127, § 25.03[2] (observing that
government regulation may become more stringent, especially as technology develops and
future scientific discoveries may reveal risks that are unknown today); Rimer, supra note
61, at 97 (stating that future scientific discoveries may reveal risks that are unknown today); Ayers, supra note 112, at 1509-10 (arguing that government regulation may become
more stringent, especially as technology develops).
139. See infra notes 139-143, 165-167.
140. See Gargas & Long, supra note 108, at 230-31; Hamilton & Viscusi, Human
Health Risk Assessments, supra note 117, at 579 n.33; Bradford C. Mank, What Comes
After Technology: Using an "Exceptions Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of
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has been considerable controversy about the assumptions used in such
estimates, including whether the hypothetical person used in these type
of estimates accurately reflects how long or how close real people typically live near such sites. 141 Furthermore, estimates based on the "average" person, typically a white man, may not reflect gender differences or
the different dietary or lifestyle patterns of various minority subpopulations.142 These differences are discussed in detail in Part IV, Section A,
below. Because residents of low-income and minority communities often
have poorer health than the general population, the Institute of Medicine,
which is affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences, has recommended that policymakers should presume that those residents may be
more susceptible than others to environmental hazards. 143 Thus, even if a
chemical is safe for the majority of the population, it may disproportionately affect certain minority groups. Yet EPA's risk assessment procedures do not adequately address this problem. l44
Federal environmental statutes and regulations vary somewhat in the
level of risk they allow. For its Superfund risk assessments, EPA requires
risks to an individual subject to a "reasonable maximum exposure," such
as living near a facility for thirty years, to be reduced to within or below
the range of a one-in-ten-thousand to a one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk. 145 EPA considers a cancer risk of one-in-one-million to be the
most conservative, protective approach to protecting health that is feasiHazardous Air Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263, 281-83, 332 (1994) [hereinafter,
Mank, What Comes After Technology].
141. See Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 312, 336-37
(looking at maximally exposed individual near a factory rather than a hypothetical maximally exposed individual can reduce estimated exposures by a factor of 100 at some
sources); see also John S. Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental
Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243,
265-70 (1997-98) (arguing that risk assessment often inflates risk through overly conservative assumptions); Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Riskfrom Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 34~ (1992) (critiquing current risk
assessment techniques used by EPA).
142. See Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative
Risk Assessmellt, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 121-23; Mank, What Comes After Technology,
supra note 140, at 336.
143. See Environmental J/lStice: Policymakers Urged to Focus on Health When Data
Are Lacking, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2231 (Mar. 12, 1999).
144. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 117-23, 151-53; Mank, What Comes After
Technology, supra note 140, at 336.
145. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan, 40 C.ER.
§ 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1998) ("For known or suspected carcinogens, acceptable exposure levels are generally concentration levels that represent an excess up~er bound lifetime
cancer risk to an individual of between 10-4 [one in ten thousand] to 10 [one in one million] ..."); OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, ROLE OF THE
BASELINE RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE SUPERFUND REMEDY SELECTION DECISIONS, OSWER
Directive No. 9355.0-30 (1991); BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 10 (EPA uses risk
range of one-in-ten-thousand to one-in-one-miIlion excess cancer deaths for Superfund
cleanups); Hamilton & Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Superfimd, supra note 113, at 167; Hamilton & Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments, supra
note 117, at 579-80, 583 n.66; Karlin, supra note 113, at 7.
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ble in a modern, industrial society.146 To put this standard into perspective, there is a one-in-one-million chance that a person will die from
smoking two cigarettes. 147
States have adopted different numeric cleanup standards. To protect
human health, some states require a maximum risk of one-in-one-million
for all types of sites. 148 Statutes requiring uniform standards for all types
of brownfield sites are less likely to cause disparate impacts against
groups that are more likely to live near industrial or commercial sites. 149
However, developers have complained that a uniform standard requiring
a maximum lifetime cancer risk of one-in-one-million is too restrictive
and prevents redevelopment of many brownfield sites. ISO Some states require a one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk standard for individual
carcinogens,1SI but allow a one-in-one-hundred-thousand ls2 or even onein-ten-thousandI53 risk if multiple carcinogens or exposure pathways are
present at a site. Other states establish a one-in-one-million or one-inone-hundred-thousand maximum risk for carcinogens at residential sites,
146. See National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R.
06
§ 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1998) ("The 10 [one in one million] risk level shall be used as
the point of departure for determining remediation goals for alternatives when ARARs are
not available or are not sufficiently protective because of the presence of multiple contaminants at a site or multiple pathways of exposure.").
147. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 5-6 (1993).
148. See FLA. STAT. § 376.81(1), (g)(I) (1997) (requiring one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk for groundwater cleanups); id. § 376.81(1)(j)(1) (requiring one-in-onemillion lifetime cancer risk for soil cleanups); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:lDB-12(d)(l) (West
1999) (soil remediation health risk standards requiring one-in-one-million lifetime cancer
risk for both residential and nonresidential uses from any particular contaminant and not
from cumulative effects of more than one contaminant).
149. See generally John Graham et aI., Who Lives Near Coke Plants and Oil
Refineries?: An Exploration of the Environmental Eqllity Hypothesis, 19 RISK ANALYSIS
171, 183 (1999) (minorities and low-income populations are more likely to live near coke
plants and oil refineries).
150. See Evan Perez, Lawmakers to Re-Examine Brownfield Clean-Up Rilles, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Fl (finding minorities are more likely to live in industrial and
commercial areas).
151. See OR. REv. STAT. 465.315(1)(b)(A) (1997) (requiring one-in-one-million
cancer risk for individual carcinogens); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-700(3)(b),(c)
(1997) (requiring one-in-one-million cancer risk for individual carcinogens, but one-inone-hundred-thousand risk for multiple carcinogens or exposure pathways); WIS. ADMIN.
CODE § 720.19(5)(1), (2) (1997) (requiring one-in-one-million cancer risk from soil contact for individual carcinogens, but one-in-one-hundred-thousand risk for cumulative exposure).
152. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a(4) (West 1999) (requiring one-inone-hundred-thousand maximum cancer risk); OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-122-045(3) (1997)
(requiring one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk for individual carcinogens, but allowing
one-in-one-hundred-thousand risk if there are more than ten carcinogens); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 173-340-700(3)(b),(c) (1997); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 720.19(5)(1), (2) (1997); Tynberg, sllpra note 96, at 477-78 (discussing risk levels in Oregon's statute and administrative regulations).
153. See 9 Va. Regs. Reg. 20-160-90(C)(I)(a) (requiring one-in-one-million cancer
risk for individual carcinogens, but one-in-ten-thousand risk for multiple carcinogens or
exposure pathways).
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but allow a one-in-ten-thousand risk for industrial uses. 154 By using lower
numerical standards for industrial or commercial sources, states use
quantitative risk assessment methodology to implement the future use
strategies discussed in Section C that contemplate lower levels of human
exposure in such areas.
Still other states set a cancer risk range between one-in-one-million
and one-in-ten-thousand lifetime risk for all types of sites. 155 Statutes that
allow a one-in-ten-thousand cancer risk in some circumstances may
cause disproportionate risks to low-income and minority groups because
they are more likely to live near industrial and commercial areas that disproportionately contain brownfield sites. 156 Furthermore, redevelopment
of such sites may pose risks in the future if subsequent users of a site fail
to maintain institutional or engineering controls. There is also a risk that
a commercial or industrial neighborhood may become residential in the
future and, thus, a plan that is protective now may become inadequate in
the future.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND BROWNFIELDS

A. Environmental Justice: Minorities Are More Likely to Live Near
Multiple Sources of Pollution and May Be More Susceptible to
Certain Chemicals

The environmental justice movement has grown into a major political movement because a number of studies have found that minority
groups and low-income people are more likely to live near sources of

154. See 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/58.5(d) (West 1998) (requiring one-in-one-million
cancer risk for residential uses, but allowing risk range of one in ten thousand to one in one
million for commercial and industrial uses); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-30009(C)(1)(a),(b)(i) (1998) (providing for risk level of one in one hundred thousand for residential and commercial and one in ten thousand for industrial uses); BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 60 (discussing Illinois' consideration of future use to determine
cleanup levels, requiring one-in-one-million cancer risk for residential uses in "Tiers I and
II," but only one-in-ten-thousand for commercial and industrial uses in "Tier ill");
Sweeney, supra note 4, at 126 n.147 (discussing Ohio's site-specific standards).
155. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE RI8-7-201(27) (1998) (setting risk range between one
in ten thousand and one in one million excess cancer risk for nonresidential uses); id. R187-201(35) (setting risk range between one in ten thousand and one in one million excess
cancer risk for residential uses); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(c)(I) (West 1999)
(setting risk range between one in ten thousand and one in one million excess cancer risk
as statewide health standard); id. § 6026.304(b) (setting risk range between one in ten
thousand and one in one million excess cancer risk for site-specific cleanups); UTAH
ADMIN. CODE § R315-101-6(c)(I)-(3),(d)-(e) (1996) (if risk is less than one in one million, no action required; if risk is between one in one million and one in ten thousand,
some corrective action or containment measures required).
156. See Arnold, supra note 23, at 80-89; see also Rabin, supra note 23, at 101-20;
supra notes 23, 125 and accompanying text.
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harmful pollutants. 157 Furthermore, cities are more likely to locate industrial or commercial zoning in low-income, high-minority census tracts
than in high-income, low-minority areas. 15S Several studies have found
that racial minority and low-income groups disproportionately live near
hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities. 159
Minorities, especially African American and Hispanic farm workers, are far more likely to be exposed to and to die from pesticide-related
illnesses. 16O Urban African American children under the age of five have
substantially higher lead levels in their blood than white children of
similar age groups living in the same cities. 161 Certain minority groups
are disproportionately likely to consume fatty fish that concentrate toxins
in their fat tissues. 162
However, other studies have failed to find that minority groups disproportionately live near hazardous waste storage facilities. 163 One highly
sophisticated study sponsored by EPA found statistically significant discrimination against Hispanics in the location of such facilities, but not
against African Americans or poor communities. l64 There is also dis157. See John A. Hird & Michael Reese, The Distriblltion of Environmental Quality:
An Empirical Analysis, 79 Soc. SCI. Q. 693, 707-11 (199S) (finding that "[e]ven when
numerous other potentially relevant variables are included in the analysis, race and ethnicity remain strongly associated with environmental quality, with both nonwhite and Hispanic populations experiencing disproportionately high pollution levels" but not finding
that low income levels are associated with higher levels of pollution); Bradford C. Mank,
Environmental Justice, in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, at 12B-7 (Michael
Gerrard ed., 1999) (summarizing several studies finding low-income and minority populations are disproportionately exposed to various types of pollutants).
15S. See Arnold, supra note 23, at SO-S9; see also Rabin, supra note 23, at 101-20;
supra notes 23, 125, 156 and accompanying text.
159. See Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 157, at 12B-7 (summarizing several studies finding evidence of environmental discrimination).
160. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at lIS.
161. See I ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING,
AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, WORKGROUP REpORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR 11, 11-12 (June 1992) [hereinafter EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT]; FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 7S-S0 (acknowledging substantial evidence that minority children are exposed to higher levels of
lead than white children, but arguing that evidence of health impacts from those higher
levels remains uncertain); Field, supra note 10, at 642 (16% of all children in United States
have elevated blood lead levels, but the rate is close to 70% for inner-city African American children); Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under TItle VI of the
Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 2S5, 299 (1995); Kuehn, supra note 142, at lIS.
162. See U.S. EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, supra note 161, at 15-16;
Kuehn, supra note 142, at lIS; Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 157, at 12B-7.
163. See generally FOREMAN, supra note IS, at IS-27 (summarizing conflicting
studies about whether hazardous waste sites are disproportionately located in minority
population areas and arguing that there is only weak evidence of disproportionate siting or
exposure); Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 157, at 12B-S (summarizing several
studies finding no evidence of environmental discrimination).
164. See Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9,
19-27, 33-34 (1997) (using 1990 census data, examining 544 communities that hosted
active commercial hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities and finding no
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agreement over whether EPA and state agencies enforce environmental
laws equally in white and minority areas. 165
There is some evidence that minority groups are disproportionately
exposed to multiple sources of pollution. 166 For instance, some studies
suggest that particular minority groups are more likely to live near Superfund sites, and, as a result, are more likely to be exposed to multiple
chemicals. 167 Furthermore, the disproportionate exposure of minorities to
multiple sources of pollution may be especially harmful because certain
minority groups have dietary or lifestyle patterns that make them likely
to consume foods that are disproportionately contaminated with harmful
pollutants, are in poorer health than the general population, or have jobs
that disproportionately expose them to contact with soil or groundwater
containing harmful pollutants. 168
Although more research is needed both about the synergistic effects
of various pollutants and about their impact on different subpopulation
groups,169 some studies suggest that combinations of two or three chemicals can dramatically increase their effects a thousandfold or more. Yet
current environmental statutes and regulations usually fail to address
such multiple and cumulative exposures because they typically govern
only one medium (Le., air, water, or land).170 Additionally, EPA has traditionally avoided questions of cumulative or synergistic impacts because
data about such impacts is lacking or more difficult and costly to develop.171 EPA has slowly begun to conduct more research about the impacts of pollution on minority and low-income groups. In 1992, EPA's
Environmental Equity Work Group issued the agency's first major report

substantial evidence that commercial hazardous waste facilities that began operating between 1970 and 1990 were sited in areas that were disproportionately African American or
Hispanic, but did find evidence that such facilities were disproportionately located in areas
of poverty).
165. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
21, 1992, at S2; Richard J. Lazarus, Essay, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L.
705, 713 (1997); Mank, Environmelltal Justice, supra note 157, at 12B-7. But see FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 23-27 (arguing studies showing disproportionate enforcement of
environmental laws harming minority groups are seriously flawed).
166. See Robert W. Collin & Robin Morris Collin, The Role of Communities in Environmental Decisions: Communities Speaking for Themselves, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
37,55-57 (1998); Hird & Reese, supra note 157, at 709-10.
167. See Hamilton & Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Supeifund, supra note 113, at 180.
168. See Lazarus, supra note 165, at 712-13. But see Vicki Ferstel, Scholar Urges
More Debate, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Jan. 6, 1999, at lB-2B (reporting that Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., senior fellow at Brookings Institution, argues there is no proof different pollutants interact to create multiple, cumulative and synergistic risk).
169. See Collin & Collin, supra note 166, at 55-56.
170. See Lazarus, supra note 165, at 712-13; Bradford C. Mank, The Environmelltal
Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for
Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 6 (1998).
171. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 117-23, 151-53; see also Lazarus, supra note
165, at 712-13. But see Ferstel, supra note 168, at lB-2B.
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on environmental justice issues,172 and the agency created the Office of
Environmental Equity (now the Office of Environmental Justice) to investigate this problem. 173 On February 11, 1994, President Clinton issued
Executive Order 12,898. 174 Section 3-3 of this Order mandates all federal
agencies to collect data about the health and environmental impact of
their actions on minority groups and low-income populations, and to develop policies to avoid adverse impacts on these groups.175 The Order
also requires federal agencies to develop environmental justice strategies l76 and achieve environmental justice goals "[t]o the greatest extent
practicable and permitted by law."177 In its 1994 Environmental Justice
Strategy, EPA pledged to increase its research of disproportionate, cumulative, and synergistic impacts on minority groups.178
Furthermore, EPA has finally begun to take into account exposure to
multiple sources of pollution. 179 However, the complexity of measuring
cumulative and synergistic impacts has caused serious problems for the
agency.180 EPA is working on a guidance document for assessing the
health effects of mixed chemicals, but it is not known when the agency
will actually issue the guidance. 181 Because brownfields may include
172. See EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, sllpra note 162, at 2.
173. See James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: PlIrslling Environmelllal

JlIstice Throllgh Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 185-86
(1994).
174. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 18 C.F.R. § 380, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994); Bradford C. Mank, Execlltive Order 12,898, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 103 (Michael Gerrard ed., forthcoming 1999).
175. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, sllpra note 174, at § 3-301; Department of Transportation Order to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and LowIncome Populations, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,377 (1997); Major Willie A. Gunn, From the La/ldfill
to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate E1Ivir01lmental Injllstice, 22 OHIO N.U.L.REV. 1227, 1252-56 (1996); Mank, Execlltive Order
12,898, sllpra note 174, at 106.
176. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, sllpra note 174, at § 1-103(e); Land Use Directive, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,781 (1995); Mank, Execlltive Order 12,898, sllpra note 174, at lOS,
107-23 (discussing the environmental justice strategies of several agencies).
177. Exec. Order No. 12,898, sllpra note 174, at § 1-101.
178. See Mank, Execlltive Order 12,898, sllpra note 174, at 109-14.
179. See Memorandum from Carol Browner, Administrator of U.S. EPA, to Assistant Administrators et aI., Cumulative Risk Assessment Guidance-Phase I Planning and
Scoping (July 3, 1997) (Guidance requires all EPA offices to consider impacts from multiple sources of chemicals "in all cases for which relevant data are available"); REPORT OF
THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, sllpra note 3, at 21 (EPA is conducting research on
the cumulative risk of air toxins and helping states to assess cumulative risk in setting total
maximum daily loads under the Clean Water Act).
180. Compare Ferstel, sllpra note 168, at lB-2B (reporting that Christopher H.
Foreman, Jr., senior fellow at Brookings Institution, argues there is no proof different pollutants interact to create multiple, cumulative and synergistic risk), with Kuehn, sllpra note
142, at 103, 117-23, 151-53 (arguing EPA should devote more resources to cumulative
and multiple risk assessments).
181. See Sara Thurin Rollin, Agency Gllidance on Chemical Mixlllres will be 'Cornerstone' of ClImlllative Risk, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 218, 218-19 (June 4, 1999); Sara
Thurin Rollin, Mixtllres Docllment Reflects Merger of Agency Views on Cancer, NO/lca/lcer
Risk, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 220, 220-21 (June 4, 1999).
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multiple chemicals and pose substantial risks, states need to revise their
risk assessment policies to address such risks.
B. Environmental Justice and Brownfields Redevelopment:
Conflicting or Complementary Goals?

There is a serious question about whether brownfield projects to reuse abandoned industrial properties will benefit the community at large
or expose the community to greater health risks. Such programs often
provide for expedited approval of permits and lower cleanup standards as
incentives for encouraging redevelopment in economically depressed
areas. IS2 Minority communities are often divided about whether the economic benefits of brownfield redevelopment outweigh the health riskS.IS3
Environmental justice advocates worry that many brownfield projects will pose serious health risks because EPA or states will lower
cleanup standards in an effort to attract industry.l84 Because urban
brownfields are often located in high population areas, some argue that
cleanup standards should be higher for these projects rather than lower. ISS
Furthermore, environmental justice advocates are concerned about
whether low-income and minority groups actually receive significant new
jobs, tax revenues, or general economic benefits from most brownfield
projects. 186 In reality, these projects often provide only a few jobs for local residents, who may lack the necessary job skills or may be the victims of discrimination. l87 The greatest benefits of new facilities in lowincome and minority areas often go to skilled workers who live in surrounding areas or to middle-class property owners who do not live close
182. See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and
the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 54-57 (1998); KibeI, supra note 1, at 60509; Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 11, at 159-60; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 706-07.
183. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 47.
184. See KibeI, supra note 1, at 607-09; Julia Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and
the Role of SupeTjund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43
BUFF. L. REv. 285, 308-11 (1995); Swanston, supra note 13, 568-72; Wernstedt & Hersh,
sllpra note 11, at 161.
185. See Swanston, supra note 13, 568-72; Julia A. Solo, supra note 184, at 30811.
186. See KibeI, supra note 1, at 607-09 (reporting proponents of environmental justice are concerned that brownfields redevelopment projects will increase health risks without providing many jobs in minority communities). But see Lynn E. Blais, Environmental
Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REv. 75, 82-83, 105-08 (1996) (arguing environmental
justice policies may discourage economic development); Stephen C. Jones & Annop G.
Shroff, Balancing Growth and the Environment: Environmental Justice Concerns Delay
I1Idustriai Expa1lsion, 13 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY, 1 (Oct. 1997) (same).
187. See KibeI, supra note 1, at 607-09; Kuehn, supra note 142, at 162; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 707; see also FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 97-99 (arguing
brownfields redevelopment projects often create a significant number of jobs, but acknowledging more evidence is needed regarding long-term employment impacts, and noting it is
more difficult to create jobs for disadvantaged individuals lacking job skills).
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to the facility. ISS For instance, in Louisiana's St. James Parish, near the
town of Covent, which environmentalists have dubbed "Cancer Alley,"
there is a high minority unemployment rate despite the presence of
twelve petrochemical, fertilizer, or other plants emitting 24 million
pounds of toxins a year. 189 Even if a community negotiates a compensation package, which may include money, park land, emergency equipment, or specific job guarantees, from a developer, the benefits do not
necessarily go to those residents who suffer the greatest risk from a project. 190 The tax proceeds usually go to the community at large rather than
to the most immediate neighbors of a facility.191
Environmental justice advocates also have moral concerns about
brownfields redevelopment. Some environmental justice advocates believe that the entire brownfields agenda stems from a conscious or unconscious desire to keep high-income, suburban areas clean at the expense of
low-income and minority groups.l92 Finally, advocates often believe that
some developers are "bad actors" who will not keep their promises and
that state (and sometimes federal) regulators often fail properly to oversee voluntary cleanup programs. 193
In contrast, brownfield advocates argue that the economic benefits
of brownfield projects far outweigh any risks, which proponents claim
environmentalists frequently exaggerate. 194 Brownfield projects can bring
significant economic benefits to low-income and minority groups who
suffer from poverty and high unemployment. 195 Furthermore, because
unemployment and poverty can lead to health problems from inadequate
nutrition and limited access to health care,196 the economic benefits of
188. See Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Sitillg: RiskBased Represelltatioll and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 410-24 (1995)
[hereinafter, Mank, Environmetal Justice and Discriminatory Siting]; Wernstedt & Hersh,
supra note 11, at 170-71.
189. See Alexander Cockburn, Case Tests Clinton's Demand for "Environmental
Justice," ARIz. REpUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1997, at B7 (discussing opposition to siting Shintech
chemical plant in St. James Parish, Louisiana); Marcia Coyle, Governor v. SllIdents in
$700M Plant Case, NAT. L.J., Sept. 8, 1997, at AI, A26-A27 (same); Deborah Mathis,
Environmental Hazards Make Small Town Hellish Place to Live, Gannett News Service,
June 1, 1999, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database.
190. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at
357-68.
191. See id. at 401-19.
192. See Swanston, supra note 13, at 571-72. But cf. McWilliams, supra note 4, at
717-22 (avoiding brownfields redevelopment will likely spread industrial pollution to
greenfields).
193. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1024-25.
194. See CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS LAMBERT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?
6, 12-13 (1994); Nelson Smith & David Graham, Brownfields, Environmental Justice, alld
Underlying Societal Problems, LEGAL TIMES, reprinted in 2 BROWNFIELD REpORT, No.17,
Sept. 4, 1997.
195. See David Friedman, The "Environmental Racism" Hoax, 9 AM. ENTERPRISE
75 (Nov. 1, 1998).
196. See BREYER, supra note 147, at 16-29; Frank B. Cross, When Environmental
Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729, 730-40
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brownfield projects may provide health benefits to an economically depressed community that outweigh any health risks from the project. 197
Thus, some proponents of brownfield projects believe that environmental
justice advocates often harm minority and low-income communities by
blocking projects that address real economic problems because of their
obsession with remote riskS. 198 Moreover, voluntary action programs
promoting brownfield redevelopment can actually benefit the environment if they result in faster, but still safe, cleanups.

V.

TITLE VI

Under Title VI, federal agencies and departments may not provide
funding to programs that discriminate on the basis of race. 199 If any program of a state or local government agency receives any federal assistance, Title VI governs the entire agency.200
Since 1993, the Clinton Administration has enforced Title VI far
more aggressively than previous administrations.201 On February 11,
1994, President Clinton issued a presidential directive on environmental
justice, accompanied by Executive Order 12,898, that requires agencies
to use their existing legal authority to achieve the environmental justice
goals in the Order.202 In particular, the directive mandates that federal
agencies providing funding to recipients with programs affecting human
health or the environment confirm that their grant recipients comply with
Title VP03 In 1994, EPA created an Office of Civil Rights to handle Title
(1995). See generally Friedman, supra note 195 (reporting that a 1991 study by University
of Pittsburgh physicist Bernard L. Cohen found that while hazardous waste and air pollution exposure reduces life expectancy by 3 to 40 days, poverty reduces life span by an
average of 10 years).
197. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at
397.
198. See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 194, at 12-13; Smith & Graham, supra
note 194.
199. Section 601 of the statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (1964) codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1988); see Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 23-25.
200. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 28. Title VI applies where federal funding
is given to an intermediary non-federal entity that distributes this funding to ultimate
beneficiaries, but does not apply to federal programs such as Social Security that pay
benefits directly to individual beneficiaries. See Colopy, supra note 173, at 154.
201. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 26-27; Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Right of Action Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 18-20
(1999) [hereinafter Mank, Private Right ofAction].
202. See Presidential Memorandum Accompanying Executive Order 12898, 30
WKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 279, 280 (1994); Mank, Executive Order 12,898, supra note 174,
at 103,107.
203. See Presidential Memorandum Accompanying Executive Order 12898, 30
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VI issues. 204 Between September 1993 and July 1998, fifty-eight environmental justice complaints were filed with the agency, including fifty
challenging state or local permit decisions/os about half of which are still
pending.206
A. Title VI: Sections 601 and 602

Title VI contains two major sections. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits federal grant recipients from engaging in discrimination. 207 Section
602 requires every federal agency or department to promulgate regulations that specify how the agency will determine whether grant applicants
or recipients are engaging in racially discriminatory practices, and to
provide a process for investigating and reviewing complaints of racial
discrimination filed with the agency.208 Since Congress enacted Title VI
in 1964, all federal agencies have adopted Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination. 209 In Guardians Association v. Civil
Service Commission, a deeply divided Supreme Court ruled that Section
601 of Title VI requires proof of intentional discrimination, but that federal grant agencies may promulgate regulations under Section 602 prohibiting recipient state or local agencies from engaging in practices resulting in discriminatory effects.210
Because it addresses disparate impact discrimination, not just intentional discrimination, Section 602 has had a far greater impact on regulating recipient behavior than Section 60J.21I Under Section 602, a citizen

Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 279, 280 (1994); Mank, Execlltive Order 12,898, supra note
174, at 103, 107.
204. See Natalie M. Hammer, Comment, Title VI as a Means of Achieving Environmental Justice, 16 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 693,711 (1996); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 26.
205. See Paul Connolly, Environmental Justice: Mayors RAP EPA at Meeting with
Browner for Failure to Consult on Interim Guidance, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 658 (July 24,
1998); Mank, Private Right ofAction, supra note 201, at 18.
206. See Patrick Merkel, Civil Rights and the Environment: EPA, States Creating
Another Regulatory Burden, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL-GREATER NEW YORK
METRO EDITION, Mar. 1999.
207. "No Person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
208. See id. § 2000d-1 (1994); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 25; Mank, Private
Right ofAction, supra note 201, at 12-13.
209. See Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939, 947-48 (1990) (discussing how task force helped agencies develop similar disparate impact regulations under
Title VI); Mank, Private Right of Action, supra note 201, at 14-16.
210. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). See also Mank,
Private Right ofAction, supra note 201, at 13-15.
211. See Mank, Private Right ofAction, supra note 201, at 12-16.
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may file an administrative complaint with EPA.212 However, it is unclear
whether Section 602 allows a private right of action in federal court. 213
B. Burden of Proof under Title VI

To succeed in a disparate impact claim, a Title VI plaintiff must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a recipient agency
has engaged in a practice that has a disproportionate impact on persons
protected by the statute.214 Further, the plaintiff must show that the
identified practice is the cause in fact of the alleged discrimination. 2ls To
establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must present evidence that a
specific minority group experienced disproportionate impacts compared
to a relevant comparison group and then persuade a court to infer that the
recipient's practices caused those disproportionate impacts. 216 For instance, a Title VI plaintiff challenging the location of a highway or hospital might compare the racial demographics of the site with appropriate
alternative sites.217
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burdens of production and persuasion shift to the defendant. The defendant must therefore either disprove the validity of the plaintiff's prima facie case or
affirmatively demonstrate "evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action."218 In other words, the defendant must show a legitimate reason of business or educational necessity for the actions
causing a disparate impact. Even though EPA's Title VI regulations appear to prohibit any discriminatory effects, courts have generally interpreted Title VI implementing regulations to prohibit unjustified disparate
impacts.219 Title VI cases suggest that defendants may be able to justify
212. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 27-29; Bradford C. Mank, Environmental
Justice and Title VI, 73 TuL. L. REv. 787, 795-98 (1999).
213. See Mank, Private Right ofAction, supra note 201, at 3-6, 37-6l.
214. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 799-800; see
also EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 600-02 (1st Cir. 1995)
(discussing standard for prima facie case under Title Vll).
215. See 48 F.3d at 600-02.
216. See, e.g., Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th
Cir. 1993) (discussing standard under Title VI for proving causation); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 799-80l.
217. See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp.
110, 127-28 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (comparing racial demographics of highway site with other
alternatives); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 800-Ol.
218. United States v. Lulac, 793 F.2d 636, 649 (5th Cir. 1986) (determining that in
Title VI cases, defendant has burden of production in showing business or educational
necessity); NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333-34 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(finding same); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 801-02.
219. See NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1334 (stating "the challenged practice must not only affect disproportionately, it must do so unnecessarily"); Concerned
Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 127 ("[d]efendants are not per se prohibited from locating a
highway where it will have differential impacts upon minorities. Rather, Title VI prohibits
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disparate impacts through safety or efficiency justifications, significant cost
savings, or the unavailability of physically suitable alternative sites.22o If the
defendant meets its burden of production and persuasion, the ultimate
burden of persuasion shifts back to the plaintiff, who then must prove
either that the defendant's justification is a pretext for discrimination or
that the defendant failed to adopt a less discriminatory alternative practice or location.221
C. EPA's Regulations

EPA currently provides funding to all state environmental agencies
as well as to virtually all state or regional siting and permitting agencies.222 Therefore, almost all state permit decisions are potentially subject
to Title VI,223 Further, state environmental agencies usually administer
state voluntary cleanup programs, so these programs are also likely to be
subject to Title VI.
EPA has promulgated regulations under Section 602 of Title VI that
prohibit recipient agencies from engaging in practices creating discriminatory effects or from locating a facility where it will have discriminatory effects, including state agencies granting environmental permits. 224
EPA's Title VI regulations state: "A recipient [of federal funds] shall not
use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color, [or] national origin."22S Furthermore, these regulations mandate that
state recipients maintain Title VI compliance programs addressing both
discrimination by the state and any beneficiaries of state-administered
funds. 226
EPA's mechanism for filing a Title VI complaint is relatively simple.
First, a complainant must file a statement alleging that a federal funds
recipient engages in discriminatory practices. 227 Within twenty days of
taking actions with differential impacts without adequate justification"); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 807.
220. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1413 (holding that lack of land for expansion at only
proposed alternative site is adequate justification); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title
VI, supra note 212, at 806-07.
221. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra
note 212, at 808.
222. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 25.
223. See id.
224. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998) (prohibiting use of discriminatory program criteria); id. § 7.35(c) (prohibiting location of facility that has discriminatory effect); Mank,
Title VI, supra note 16, at 25-26.
225. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b). See also 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (prohibiting location of facility that has discriminatory effect).
226. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.410 (1998).
227. The complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory action, but complainants can request waiver of this time limit for good cause. See 40 C.F.R.
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receiving a complaint, EPA conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether the complaint states a valid claim of discrimination and
is within the agency's jurisdiction.228 If EPA accepts the complaint for investigation, the agency encourages the parties to reach an informal settlement.229
If a formal investigation of the allegations is necessary, EPA may request
information from or conduct an on-site review of the recipient.230 Should
EPA find that a recipient has engaged in discrimination, the agency's
main remedy is termination of the recipient's funding. 231 The agency cannot provide any direct relief or attorneys' fees to the complainant.232

D. EPA's Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative
Complaints Challenging Permits
1. Introduction
There has been much controversy about the amount of evidence needed
to prove disparate impact discrimination under Title VI. In February 1998,
EPA promulgated a controversial Interim Guidance to help the agency's
Office of Civil Rights resolve a number of pending Title VI complaints.233
This Subpart will briefly discuss the substance of the Interim Guidance,
and Subpart E will explain the political controversy about how to revise
the Interim Guidance so that it allows for reasonable economic development while protecting minority groups.

2. Disparate and Cumulative Impacts
While its main purpose is to define what types of environmental decisions cause impermissible disparate impacts, the Interim Guidance does not
provide clear answers about how EPA will determine whether a recipient's
action caused adverse disparate impacts against protected minority groupS.234
The Interim Guidance states that the agency will not use a single methodol§ 7.120 (1998); Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: A Brief
History of Administrative Complaints Under TItle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 309, 314-16, 319 (1994); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 27.
228. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(I) (1998); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 27.
229. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(2) (1998); Cole, supra note 227, at 316-17; Mank,
TItle VI, supra note 16, at 27.
230. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(a) (1998) (authorizing EPA's Office of Civil Rights to
conduct compliance reviews); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 27-28.
231. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130 (1998); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 28; Mank, Private Right ofAction, supra note 201, at 22-24.
232. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a) (1998); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 29; Mank,
Private Right ofAction, supra note 201, at 22-24.
233. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 2; Mank, TItle VI, supra note
16, at 40-45; Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 789,809.
234. See Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 40-44; Mank, Environmental Justice and
TItle VI, supra note 212, at 810-14.
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ogy for evaluating disparate impacts, but will employ several techniques to
analyze the "totality of circumstances" in each case.235 The Interim Guidance explains that the agency is more likely to investigate and to find disparate impacts if a proposed facility will be located in a community that
already has several polluting facilities and currently suffers from a disproportionate amount of pollution. 236 Thus, the Interim Guidance indicates that the agency will consider not just impacts from a proposal, but
will also assess the cumulative burden of surrounding facilities.23 7 However, the Interim Guidance does not provide a clear explanation of how
the agency will measure the cumulative pollution burden.238
EPA's independent Science Advisory Board ("SAB") has examined
EPA's methods for measuring both disproportionate impact and cumulative effects in Title VI complaints. 239 The SAB found that EPA's new Cumulative Outdoors Air Toxics Concentration Exposure Methodology
("COATCEM") is an improvement over previous methods and shows
significant promise. Yet the SAB concluded that COATCEM's application to Title VI analysis has not been fully developed and that it is not
clear whether the approach can be applied within the normal ISO-day
time for responding to Title VI complaints.240 The SAB has also recommended that the agency examine the potential risk to all populations,
whether significant or de minimis, before estimating the extent of any
disproportionate impact.241
a. Compliance with the Law
The Interim Guidance explicitly states that "merely demonstrating
that the permit complies with applicable environmental regulations will
not be considered a substantial, legitimate justification."242 The Interim
Guidance suggests that even if a proposed facility complies with existing
regulations, a recipient may not grant a permit that will cause unaccept235. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 9; Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at
42; Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 812.
236. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 10-11; Mank, Environmental
Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 812.
237. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 10-11; Mank, TItle VI, supra
note 16, at 42-43; Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 812-13.
238. See Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 812-13. See
generally EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 9-12.
239. See SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. EPA, AN SAB REPORT: REVIEW OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT METHODOLOGIES, EPA-SAB-IHEC-99-007 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter SAB Report]; see also Cheryl Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps for EPA in Analyses of
Disproportionate Impacts, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1310, 1310-11 (Oct. 30, 1998).
240. See SAB Report, supra note 239, at 1-3. COATCEM evaluates the cumulative
impacts of cancer and non-cancer risk separately, and the SAB found that such separate
analysis was appropriate.
241. See id. at 3.
242. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12. See Mank, TItle VI, supra note
16, at 43.
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able disproportionate impacts in conjunction with the cumulative burden
from existing facilities. 243
However, in November 1998, EPA rejected a Title VI complaint
challenging Select Steel's proposed construction of a steel plant in Flint,
Michigan because the facility was in compliance with the Clean Air
Act's health-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone
and lead. 244 Some commentators believe that Select Steel demonstrates
that a permit's compliance with health-based standards will always satisfy Title VI.245 Whether compliance with technology-based or performance-based standards, as opposed to health-based standards, will defeat a
Title VI claim also is unclear.246 Until EPA revises its Interim Guidance,
when or whether a permit's compliance with existing regulatory standards is sufficient under the statute remains uncertain.247

b. Mitigation and Justification
The Interim Guidance strongly encourages recipients to mitigate
any environmental harms that may cause disparate impacts in order to
avoid Title VI violations. 248 The Interim Guidance also requires recipients to
select a less discriminatory alternative if it is equally effective in addressing
the permit applicant's goalS.249 However, EPA's restrictive "equally effective"
standard for alternatives may allow recipients to use minor differences be-

243. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 10-11; Mank, Environmental
Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 812-13.
244. See Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, to
St. Francis Prayer Center [Complainant] and Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality [Recipient), RE: EPA File No. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complaint) (Oct. 30, 1998)
(dismissing Title VI complaint against Michigan Department of Environmental Quality)
(on file with author); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 48-50.
245. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Draft Revision of Guidance for
Processing Civil Rights Complaints Expected Mid-1999, 29 ENV'T REp. (BNA) 1807 (Jan.
15, 1999) (reporting the opinion of Professor Richard Lazarus, a member of EPA's Title VI
Implementation Advisory Committee, that Select Steel suggests compliance with appropriate health-based standards will usually defeat Title VI claim); Mank, Title VI, supra note
16, at 49-50.
246. See Hogue, supra note 245, at 1807 (explaining that Professor Richard Lazarus, a member of EPA's Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee, believes a permit's
compliance with either technology-based or performance-based standards that do not
specify at what level pollution will cause adverse health effects will not necessarily defeat
a Title VI claim); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 50.
247. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 44; see also Hogue, supra note 245, at
1807 (discussing when compliance with existing law will defeat a Title VI claim).
248. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5, 11-12; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 814.
249. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5,11-12. But see Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 822-23 (arguing EPA should use a
"comparably effective" less discriminatory alternative standard in Title VI cases because
its "equally effective" standard makes it too easy for recipients to use minor differences to
reject a less discriminatory alternative).
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tween sites to exclude sites that could achieve similar goals with fewer
impacts on minorities.250
According to the Interim Guidance, if a facility poses a significant
health risk to minorities despite mitigation efforts, the recipient may still
provide a substantial, legitimate justification for why the benefits of the
facility are sufficient to outweigh the cost of the disparate impacts.251 In
evaluating the proffered justification, EPA will consider the state or local
government's interest in approving the project, the seriousness of the disparate impacts, whether the permit involves a renewal of an existing facility "with demonstrated benefits" or a new project with "more speculative benefits," and whether the project will provide employment or other
benefits to the particular community that is the subject of the Title VI
complaint.252 It is at this stage that a brownfield redeveloper can emphasize the economic and environmental benefits of a project to the surrounding community. However, the Interim Guidance fails to provide any
guidelines for balancing health risks against economic benefits.
E. EPA's Response to Controversy over Title VI and Brownfields

State and local regulators as well as industry representatives have
strongly criticized the Interim Guidance for failing to define crucial issues, such as when a disparate impact constitutes impermissible discrimination.253 Many contend that uncertainty about how EPA will apply
the Interim Guidance discourages business from locating in minority areas for fear that EPA will subsequently decide that a project in a minority
community causes disparate impacts, and that this uncertainty will especially affect the redevelopment of brownfield properties. 254 In July 1998,
several mayors, including many Democratic mayors who usually support
the Clinton Administration, met with EPA Administrator Carol Browner
to argue that EPA's environmental justice policies, especially the Interim
Guidance, could threaten their and the agency's efforts to redevelop contaminated brownfields.255 The mayors argued that the Interim Guidance's
250. See Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 823.
251. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12.
252. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12.
253. See FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 59; John H. Cushman, Jr., Pollution Policy is
Unfair Burden, States Tell EPA, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1998, at 1; Mank, TItle VI, supra note
16, at 40-44; Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 810.
254. See, e.g., Stephen Jones & Annop G. Shroff, Environmental Justice COllcems
Delay Industrial Expallsion, 13 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITlG. STRATEGY 1 (Oct. 1997);
Catherine M. Ward, Environmental Justice for All: Why There Are Fewer Brownfields in
White Neighborhoods?, 154 N.J.L.J. 253 (Oct. 26, 1998).
255. See Letter from Carol Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA, to U.S. Conference
of Mayors (June 18, 1998) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review); Carol
Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA, Speech to Environmental Justice Roundtable, Detroit,
Michigan (July 17, 1998); Connolly, supra note 205, at 658 (reporting that many mayors
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vague and potentially open-ended definition of disparate impacts would lead
developers to avoid brownfield redevelopment in minority areas because too
much uncertainty remains as to which projects are acceptab1e.256 However,
EPA has asserted that its Interim Guidance is unlikely to restrict brownfield
development and observed that no citizen has yet filed a Title VI complaint
against such a project.257 Similarly, many environmentalists and civil rights
leaders believe that the Interim Guidance permits development in minority
neighborhoods as long as reasonable efforts are taken to protect minority
groupS.258
As a result of this controversy, in October 1998, President Clinton
signed a moratorium on EPA accepting new Title VI complaints until the
agency issues a final guidance on Title VI. 259 Congress drafted the moratorium to force EPA to revise the Interim Guidance so as to promulgate
policies that are more favorable to economic development in minority
communities, including brownfield redevelopment.260 For Fiscal Year
2000, President Clinton signed legislation retaining the moratorium for
another year.261 Despite the moratorium on new complaints, many state
officials, including members of the National Governors Association, remain concerned that the Interim Guidance will discourage industry from

are concerned that EPA's Title VI policies will undermine brownfield redevelopment);
Jones & Shroff, supra note 253, at 1 (arguing EPA's environmental justice and Title VI
policies threaten to undermine its brownfield policies). But see Luke W. Cole & Richard
Moore, Attacks on EPA Unfair, USA TODAY, July 20, 1998, at 14A (arguing EPA's environmental justice policies need not hinder brownfields' redevelopment).
256. See FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 59; Cushman, supra note 253, at 1; Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 40,44; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212,
at 810; EPA Defends Environmental Justice Policy, Process to Bliley, ENVTL. POL'y
ALERT, Dec. 30, 1998, at 30-31 (reporting that Congressman Thomas Bliley is concerned
that Interim Guidance could interfere with brownfield projects).
257. See David Warner & James Worsham, The EPA's New Reach, NATION'S BUSINESS, Oct. 1, 1998, at 12,17 (reporting interview with EPA Administrator Carol Browner);
EPA Defends Environmental Justice Policy, Process to Bliley, supra note 256, at 30-31
(reporting that Ann Goode, director of EPA's Office of Civil Rights, contends that the Interim Guidance is unlikely to interfere with brownfield projects).
258. See Angela M. Baggetta, Environmental Justice: Black Caucus, EPA to Meet
on Shintech; Dispute May Be Test Case on Title VI Suits, 139 DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA),
July 21, 1998, at A-I; Cole & Moore, supra note 255, at 14A; Mank, Title VI, supra note
16, at 40.
259. The legislation does not affect 15 ongoing investigations. See Appropriations
Act for Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies for Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat.
2461 (1998); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 810; Cindy
Skrzycki, The Regulators: With EPA as Judge-Up Against the Environmental Justice System, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at Fl; Bill Walsh, Law Puts EPA Bias Rules on Hold:
Industry Targets Racism Probes, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 23, 1998, at A8.
260. See Skrzycki, supra note 259, at Fl; Walsh, supra note 259, at A8.
261. See Departments of Veteran Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and
Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2000, H.R. 2684, 106th Congo (1999); H.R.
REP. No. 106-286 (1999).
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locating in minority areas because the moratorium will not last
indefinitely.262
To address bipartisan concerns about the Interim Guidance's vague
definitions and possible adverse consequences, EPA Administrator Carol
Browner established a Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee to
help the agency develop environmental justice policies that are protective
of minority communities, yet allow for economic development. 263 However, the Advisory Committee has failed to achieve a consensus about
how to address many Title VI issues. 264 Additionally, EPA is using
brownfield sites in six cities as case studies to examine how the Title VI
complaint process affects cleanup, economic redevelopment and permitting issues at such sites.265 In 1999, EPA, brownfield developers, environmentalists, and equity advocates finally began working together to create a
sustainable redevelopment process that addresses growth, environmental
quality, and equity issues. 266
EPA has suggested that its revised Title VI policy will better address
brownfield redevelopment issues. 267 By the beginning of 2000, the agency
intends to issue a draft revision of its Interim Guidance on how the
agency will review Title VI complaints.268 Furthermore, during the fiscal
year 2000, the agency may promulgate a separate draft guidance suggesting how state and local agencies can avoid such complaints. 269 EPA
plans to issue both guidances as draft documents and to take public
comments on them before issuing final versions,270 but will not issue either
as a formal rule. 271

262. See David Mastio, EPA Rule Faces Challenge: Governors to Consider Request
to Change Environmental Policy, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 23, 1999, at Bl.
263. See Connolly, supra note 205, at 658; EPA Bungling Leaves 'EnvironmellIal
Justice' Elusive, USA TODAY, July 20, 1998, at 14A. But see Cole & Moore, supra note
255, at 14A (arguing EPA's environmental justice policies need not hinder brownfields'
redevelopment).
264. See REPORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 5-10;
Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Title VI Advisory Panel Report Sets Out Issues,
Gives No Recommendations, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2188 (Mar. 5,1999).

265. Fiscal 2000 Water and Env't Budget: Hearings Before the SubcolIIlII. on Water
Resources and Env't of the House Comm. On Transp. and Infrastructllre, 106th Congo
(Feb. 10, 1999) (Prepared Testimony of Timothy Fields, Acting Assistant Administrator,
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA).

266. See EPA, Stakeholder Group to Launch New Brownfields Redevelopllle1lt Program, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Mar. 24, 1999, at 9.
267. See David Sive & Lemuel M. Srolovic, Environmental Justice Issues Develop;
Facility Permits and Civil Rights, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 1998, at Sl.
268. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Agency Planning to Issue Draft of
Revised Guidance in Late Summer, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 178 (May 28,1999).
269. See Hogue, supra note 245, at dl1.
270. See id.
271. See EPA to Revise Title VI Guidance Under Rulemaking Procedures, ENVTL.
POL'y ALERT, May 5, 1999, at 31 (reporting EPA will follow rulemaking procedures for
soliciting public comment in revising its interim policy on environmental justice, but will
not make the guidance legally binding as a rule).
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PROBLEMS WITH STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS

There are considerable uncertainties about how EPA will revise its
Title VI policies. Nevertheless, states can implement several reforms now
to insure that their brownfield programs comply with Title VI regardless
of future EPA actions. Before discussing these reforms, it will be helpful
to identify how brownfield programs typically fail to address discrimination concerns.
State brownfield programs typically commit errors of omission.
First, they generally do not consider whether the approval of a project
will create disproportionate impacts on minority groups. Second, state
brownfield programs usually do not consider the cumulative burden of a
project in conjunction with existing sources of pollution.
Provisions in state brownfield statutes or regulations that allow
lower health standards in industrial areas or in areas projected to be nonresidential are also a problem. In light of evidence that minority groups
are significantly more likely to live in nonresidential areas,272 state
brownfield statutes or regulations that allow lower health standards in
these areas raise serious questions under Title VI because such provisions
may disproportionately increase health risks to protected minority
groups.
A. Errors of Omission
State brownfield programs typically do not address whether projects
will affect minority groups or examine whether the effects are disproportionate. State brownfield statutes and regulations implicitly assume that a
project is acceptable if it meets all applicable federal or state permitting
requirements. However, the Interim Guidance explicitly states that "merely
demonstrating that the permit complies with applicable environmental
regulations will not be considered a substantial, legitimate justification."273
Even if it complies with existing regulations, a facility may cause unacceptable disproportionate impacts if its pollution is added to the cumulative burden from existing facilities. 274 While there are still uncertainties
about how EPA will evaluate cumulative and synergistic pollution impacts, states should revise their voluntary action programs now at least to
examine the extent to which a project will add to existing pollution im-

272. See slIpra notes 23, 125 and accompanying text.
273. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, slIpra note 18, at 12; Mank, Title VI, slIpra note 16,
at 43; slIpra notes 242-247 and accompanying text.
274. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, slIpra note 18, at 10-11; Mank, Title VI, slIpra
note 16, at 42-43; Mank, Environmental Jllstice and Title VI, slIpra note 212, at 812-13;
sllpra notes 242-247 and accompanying text.
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pacts in the surrounding area and whether increases in pollution will disproportionately affect minority populations.
Additionally, state brownfield programs typically focus on the safety
of the proposed site and do not require the developer to assess alternative
locations. Most state programs also do not mandate the use of mitigation.
The Interim Guidance, however, requires recipients to take of all these
steps. It states that the agency expects a recipient to mitigate any
significant impacts against minorities. 275 If a facility poses a significant
health risk to minorities despite these mitigation efforts, the Interim
Guidance requires the recipient to provide a substantial, legitimate
justification for why the benefits of the facility are sufficient to outweigh
the cost of the disparate impacts.276 The Interim Guidance also states that
"a justification offered will not be considered acceptable if it is shown
that a less discriminatory alternative exists" that is "equally effective in
meeting the needs addressed by the challenged" proposal. 277
Most states had enacted their voluntary action programs before EPA
issued its Interim Guidance. Hence, it is not surprising that these programs do not address the Interim Guidance's concerns about disparate
impacts, cumulative pollution burdens, mitigation, cost-benefit analysis,
or evaluation of less discriminatory alternatives. Understandably, states
may hesitate to revise their programs until EPA issues a final Title VI
guidance resolving a number of controversial issues. However, Part VII
argues that states should implement as soon as possible many needed
changes in their voluntary action programs, even before EPA issues its
revised Title VI guidance.
B. Lower Standards in Industrial and Nonresidential Areas

Since many state brownfield programs allow consideration of a
site's future use and some explicitly authorize lower health standards in
nonresidential areas, their policies could violate Title VI if states are
significantly more likely to approve high-risk projects in minority communities. Because members of at least some minority groups are more
likely to live in nonresidential areas,278 an environmental justice complainant could argue that policies allowing lower standards in such areas
constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination. The standard for

275. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 11; Mank, Title VI, supra note
16, at 43; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 814; supra note
248 and accompanying text.
276. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12; Mank, Title VI, sllpra note
16, at 43-44; supra notes 251-252 and accompanying text.
277. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5, 12; Mank, Environmental JIIStice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 814-28; supra note 249 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 23, 125 and accompanying text.
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proving a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VI is relatively
easy to meet because statistical evidence of significant disparities between a minority group and a relevant comparison group is often enough
to raise an inference of causation.279 Hence, states need to reexamine the
future use provisions in their voluntary action programs to explore
whether they may cause adverse, disparate impacts to certain minority
groups.
While consideration of a site's future use or nonresidential status
does not inevitably violate Title VI, a state must ensure that voluntary
action programs that allow lower health standards in nonresidential areas
do not adversely affect a substantial number of people, including members of racial minority groups. Indeed, by ensuring that its future use or
nonresidential policies do not disproportionately affect racial minority
groups, a state will likely avoid adverse effects against all neighbors of
such projects. Because voluntary action programs typically seek to promote brownfield redevelopment, states have glossed over some difficult
issues, including alternatives, synergistic impacts, and long-term risks.
By addressing the Title VI concerns, states are more likely to address the
difficult issues affecting all populations.

VII. IMPROVING DATA COLLECTION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS:
A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPLYING WITH TITLE VI

States should implement several reforms now to avoid Title VI
complaints against brownfield projects. If states implement these reforms, EPA should give greater, but not automatic, deference to voluntary
action programs.
First, to determine whether brownfield projects might create disparate impacts on minority groups, states should amend their voluntary action programs to require developers to collect data about the racial
demographics and relative burden of pollution in several neighborhoods
surrounding brownfield projects.280 States should require developers to
prepare a community impact statement similar to the environmental impact statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act that
addresses the environmental and social impacts of a brownfield project,
as well as possible alternatives and mitigation measures.281 Furthermore,
states should require developers to consider whether their project will
279. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 799-801.
280. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 30-31;
EPA, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS, supra note 26, at 31-33,96-102.
281. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1015-16 (proposing CIS). See generally Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212 (discussing consideration of alternatives
and mitigation under Title VI, the Clean Water Act, and NEPA).
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cause adverse disparate impacts on a minority group, including an individualized risk assessment that examines the specific risks of developing
the proposed site. Additionally, state agencies should require a developer
to consider less discriminatory alternatives to a project because that is
potentially one of the most important ways to avoid harm to minority
groups.282 A finding of elevated pollution levels or disparate impacts in a
minority area would not automatically preclude the siting of a project,
but such evidence would place a greater burden on a developer and a
permitting agency to justify such a project. Once such a finding has been
made, a developer or permitting agency should have to show substantial
need for the project, the unavailability of alternative sites, and strong
community support.
While Title VI does not mandate public participation, emerging
principles of environmental justice demand that the public have an opportunity to comment on a community impact statement. Because risk
assessment is complex and experts often disagree, states should provide
technical assistance, including grants, to citizen groups, minority groups,
or local communities to enable them to conduct research to challenge any
data submitted by industry supporting a brownfield proposal. Both EPA
and states should fund community monitoring programs to ensure that a
project complies with all applicable permits. Additionally, states and local governments should develop effective community monitoring programs both to gather data and to address community concerns. 283 Finally,
states should establish procedures for early and meaningful public participation in the process for approving a voluntary cleanup plan.284
While the agency must evaluate each Title VI complaint on its own
merits, EPA should give greater deference to states that have strong data
collection and public participation programs. In its revised Title VI guidance, EPA should explicitly encourage states to improve their data collection and public participation programs.

282. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 815-28 (discussing consideration of alternatives under Title VI and NEPA).
283. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 55.
284. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 840-41; REPORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 33 (stating "early intervention reduces the possibility that delays will cost industry time, money, and even a competitive advantage in the siting or expansion of new and existing facilities"); NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL (NEJAC), U.S. EPA, MODEL PLAN FOR PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION 7 (Nov. 1996) [hereinafter NEJAC, MODEL PLAN] (proposing government
agencies "[s]olicit stakeholder involvement early in the policy-making process, beginning
in the planning and development stages and continuing through implementation and oversight"); NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL (NEJAC), U.S. EPA,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN REVITALIZATION, AND BROWNFIELDS: THE SEARCH FOR
AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE 20-22 EPA 500-R-96-002 (1996) (stating "[e]arly, ongoing,
and meaningful public participation is a hallmark of sound public policy and decision
making").
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A. Requiring Developers to Collect Data and Consider Possible

Disparate Impacts on Minorities
1. State Mapping Programs for High-Risk Areas

States should develop mapping programs to identify areas at high
risk. EPA's Title VI Advisory Committee has encouraged states to develop a preventative "Track 1" program to identify areas in which there
are disproportionate impacts and to develop mitigation plans to reduce
such adverse effects; the agency is beginning to distinguish between preventative "Track 1" programs and "Track 2" programs that address actual
complaints of discrimination. 285 The Track 1 program is intended to
identify areas with high levels of cumulative pollution and to redress
such problems before a citizen files a Title VI complaint about an individual permit application. In particular, the Committee suggested that
agencies at all levels of government examine the cumulative effects on
human health and environment of all pollution sources without regard to
whether such pollution is exempt from any applicable permitting process
or law. 286
a. Identifying High-Risk Areas

There have been several proposals to identify environmental highimpact areas, to require special data collection in such areas, and even to
impose a moratorium on construction in such areas. In 1992, thenSenator Al Gore and Representative John Lewis introduced legislation in
Congress that would have placed a moratorium on siting new facilities in
"environmental high impact areas," which were defined as the 100 counties in the United States with the highest total weight of toxic chemicals
in the air, water, and land.287 In 1995, an environmental justice bill in the
Pennsylvania General Assembly would have required the state to list the
100 highest impact areas in the Commonwealth, to assess any adverse
health impacts in those areas, to ensure that all groups or individuals in
those areas were able to participate in the technical process for determining adverse impacts, to award technical assistance grants, and to
promulgate regulations to address any significant adverse impacts.288 Unfortunately, none of this legislation ever became law.

285. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 30-3l.
286. See id. at 43-44.
287. See H.R. 5326, 102d Congo (1992); S. 2806, 102d Congo (1992); Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 353-54.
288. See H.R. 2321, 180th Gen. Ass., 1995-96 Regular Sess. (Pa. 1995); Carolyn
Graham & Jennifer B. Grills, Comment, Environmental Justice: A Survey of Federal and
State Responses, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 253-58 (1997).
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In 1998 the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia proposed an
"Environmental Justice Protocol" that would prohibit construction of new
facilities in any "affected area" where the public health is "substandard."
The proposal used a radius approach for determining the affected population. The proposal defined "affected area" to be a circle a half-mile in
radius around the facility, but enlarged the circle if it did not contain at
least one thousand residents. 289 The Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia has urged EPA to adopt its radius and public health approach because of the difficulties of determining cumulative and synergistic
risks. 290 However, there is considerable disagreement about the appropriate size of the radius. Industry prefers a smaller, "fence-line" approach
that focuses only on those at greatest risk, those living closest to a plant's
fence-line. There is some value to industry's preferred approach. Current
siting schemes tend to give too much weight to existing political subdivisions and not enough attention to the concerns of those at greatest risk. 291
Conversely, environmentalists appropriately fear that a small radius will
exclude larger population groups still at some risk. As a result, the Public
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia withdrew its initial proposal and has
solicited additional comments about a revised draft proposal suggesting a
one-mile radius. 292
While there are disagreements about how to define high-risk areas,
an imperfect mapping program is likely to be better than none at all. Any
program that seriously attempts to identify areas with high levels of pollution and tries to correlate them with minority popUlations will help
states to determine if a proposed brownfield project should receive special scrutiny because it will be located in a high-risk neighborhood.
b. Will Mapping Prevent All Development?

A mapping program that identifies high-risk areas can help determine the extent of data collection needed for a project, yet mapping may
have some undesirable effects. There is the danger that a mapping program will falsely identify some areas as high-risk that later turn out to be
safe for development. Industry and state officials fear that programs to
289. See Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, "Environmental Justice Protocol" (proposed October 1, 1998) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review).
290. See Letter from Jerome Balter, Director of Environmental Justice Project. Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, to Elliot Laws, Chair. U.S. EPA Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee, and Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, U.S.
EPA, 2 (Apr. 29, 1999) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review).
291. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188. at
401-19.
292. See Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Draft Environmental Justice
Standard for the City of Philadelphia,"(May 4, 1999) (revised draft proposed one mile
radius) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review); Public Interest Law Center of
Philadelphia, "The EPA Needs a Workable Environmental Justice Protocol," (proposed
Feb. 18, 1999) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review).
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map, screen, or identify minority areas with high levels of pollution will
discourage business development in minority neighborhoods and are especially concerned about the impact of mapping for brownfield redevelopment.293 Some industry representatives and state governments point out
that mapping technology often simply identifies areas with large numbers
of facilities or pollution, but does not measure actual exposure and risk
levels in particular communities. 294
Due to these risks, mapping should not be used to preclude all development in a community. Instead, identifying potentially high-risk areas should be the first step in a dialogue about what types of brownfield
redevelopment are appropriate in a community that may suffer from both
high levels of unemployment and cumulative impacts of pollution. A distinction should be made between brownfield redevelopment that carries
high or low risk to a community.295 States should adopt special brownfield
programs to examine potential low-polluting uses for brownfield properties
and discuss which types of projects are appropriate in areas with already
high levels of pollution.
States should not wait for EPA's revised Title VI guidance and
should begin identifying areas with potentially high levels of cumulative
pollution and disproportionate adverse impacts now. A state typically
must collect demographic and cumulative burden data if a citizen files a
plausible Title VI complaint. States probably can avoid many Title VI
complaints if they know before approving a project whether a proposal is
likely to have disproportionate impacts on minorities. In Select Steel,
EPA reached a decision rejecting a Title VI complaint within two and
one-half months because Michigan quickly provided a complete set of
records justifying its decision and exerted political pressure for an early
ruling. 296 EPA's rapid resolution of the Select Steel Title VI complaint
suggests that if a state already has data showing that a proposal is unlikely to have disproportionate impacts against minorities, EPA will
quickly dismiss a complaint rather than conduct a time-consuming investigation. 297

293. See REPORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMl\fiTTEE, supra note 3, at 68-69.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 69.
296. See Letter from Ann E. Goode, supra note 244 (noting that the U.S. EPA stated
that it was able to reach a fast but thorough decision because Michigan officials had
quickly provided the agency with complete records on the original state permit decision);
Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 49.
297. Whether EPA's decision in Select Steel was biased by political factors is beyond the scope of this Article. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 49-50 for a discussion
of Select Steel.
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2. Developer Community Impact Statements
a. Writing Effective Community Impact Statements at
Reasonable Cost

States should require developers to write a concise but thorough
community impact statement ("CIS") about the health and economic impacts of their project, allow citizens to comment on that statement, and
require a state environmental agency to approve it before the developers
may undertake a voluntary cleanup. In preparing a CIS, states should require brownfield developers to collect information about the extent to
which minorities are disproportionately located near brownfields. Additionally, if a statute or regulation authorizes lower health standards for
nonresidential brownfield projects, states should require a developer that
seeks to apply the lower standards to collect and evaluate information on
the extent to which minorities are likely to live near such sites. States or
developers also should collect data on the extent to which minority residents actually will benefit from new jobs or taxes resulting from redevelopment of a brownfield site.298 In addition, states should require a permit
applicant's CIS to address mitigation measures, the possibility of less
discriminatory alternatives to the project, and the costs and benefits of a
project.
Developers are likely to argue that writing a CIS is too timeconsuming and expensive, but many states already require the collection
of some data to determine the overall risk to surrounding areas of proposed brownfield projects.299 Several state voluntary action programs already allow developers to use a site-specific risk assessment and thus
there is some experience with such studies. 3°O A site-specific examination
of a facility's individual and cumulative pollution burdens potentially
provides a great deal of information about its risk to surrounding communities, including any special risks it may pose to minority communities. 30l
Additionally, federal agencies routinely prepare environmental assessments. For major federal projects, the NEPA already requires federal
agencies or states receiving substantial federal assistance to write an environmental assessment that considers a proposed project's environmental
impacts and alternatives to the proposal.302 Several states have mini-NEPAs
298. EPA's Interim Guidance explicitly considers economic benefits in evaluating
whether a recipient agency's permit or other decisionmaking creates unacceptable, disparate impacts against a minority group. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12;
supra text accompanying notes 251-252.
299. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 94, 109-110 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 334-38.
302. To determine whether a proposed action is a "major Federal action[ 1
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or other statutes with similar requirements.303 In ninety-nine percent of the
cases, the agency prepares a simple fifteen to twenty page environmental
assessment and then a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI"). Only a
small number of projects have significant environmental impacts that require
an agency to prepare a more elaborate environmental impact statement.
Brownfield developers would normally only prepare a relatively short
environmental assessment unless the project involves unusual risks. This
Article proposes to extend the environmental assessment project to
purely private brownfield projects that are not currently subject to these
requirements. The special risks posed by brownfield projects justify the
need for community impact statements in this area.
While preparing an environmental assessment is costly, it often
leads to substantial benefits. As a result of writing an impact statement,
agencies often modify a proposed project to lessen environmental impacts, although they are less likely to cancel a project altogether. 304 The
benefits of conducting an environmental assessment can be greater if a
developer is required to implement mitigation measures. Though NEPA
merely requires that an agency evaluate mitigation measures,305 other
statutes impose substantive mitigation requirements. For example, the
Army Corps of Engineers frequently requires mitigation measures as a
condition for obtaining a wetlands permit to achieve the Clean Water
Act's goal of "no net loss" of wetlands and also requires applicants to
adopt practicable alternatives if they will cause less harm to wetlands. 306

significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" requiring an EIS, agencies
draft an Environmental Assessment (EA) that examines the need for the project, considers
alternatives to the proposal, discusses the impacts of the proposal and any alternatives, and
may discuss mitigation measures. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. ill 1999); 40
C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1998) (stating that NEPA requires an agency to consider alternatives to
the proposed action); Valerie Fogelman, Environmental Impact Statements, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.07 (Michael Gerrard ed., 1999); Stephen M. Johnson,
NEPA and SEPA's in the Questfor Environmental Justice, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 565, 570
(1997); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 819,821-22,829-31.
303. See Johnson, supra note 302, at 598-99; Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice:
Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and "Justice," 47 AM. U. L. REv. 221, 293
n.358 (1997) (listing 13 states and Puerto Rico as having state statutes or regulations based
on NEPA that require an agency to consider alternatives); Mank, Environmental Justice
and Title VI, supra note 212, at 819; see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.448(1)(k) (1997).
304. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1016.
305. For instance, NEPA does not require that agencies or private applicants actually implement mitigation measures, but the lead agency must discuss how such measures
could minimize any environmental impacts. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 u.s. 332 (1990); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (1998); DANIEL R. MANDELKER,
NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 8.08[10] (2d ed. 1999); Mank, Environmental Justice and
Title VI, supra note 212, at 819,821-22,829-31.
306. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.1O(d) (1998) (requiring compensatory mitigation in appropriate circumstances); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (1998) (same); 33 C.F.R. § 230.1O(a) (1998)
(requiring Army Corps of Engineers to reject wetlands permit if a practicable alternative
exists that is less damaging to the aquatic ecosystem); Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. EPA and Department of Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation
Under Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990); Friends
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Furthermore, some state statutes require state agencies to mitigate
significant impacts. 307
Although the evaluation of less discriminatory, rather than less environmentally harmful, alternatives raises different considerations, many
state and local governments already consider alternatives as part of their
siting process.308 Collecting additional information about the racial
demographics of alternative sites to develop or redevelop should not
prove difficult for recipients.
States can minimize the costs of data collection by authorizing a
limited, preliminary inquiry before requiring more extensive data collection. 309 EPA and states usually allow a potential purchaser of commercial
property to conduct a limited Phase I audit of whether the property has
been used before in such a way that contamination is likely.310 Phase I
audits usually involve the review of existing land use information, such
as a title search or the examination of aerial photographs, to determine if
a site was used for industrial purposes.3J1 Only if the Phase I audit suggests a significant possibility of contamination must a purchaser or developer conduct a Phase II audit, which usually involves testing soil or
groundwater for contamination. 312
Similarly, states should require all brownfield developers to conduct
a preliminary audit of existing census data on the demographic composition of the surrounding area and a limited examination of other major
pollution sources in the area. Only if the quasi-Phase I audit indicates
that significant minority populations or substantial cumulative pollution

of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding mitigation through
off-site purchase of wetlands); MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 305,
§ 8.08[10]; Marc R. Bulson, Off-Site Mitigation and the EIS Threshold: NEPA's Faulty
Framework, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 101 (1992).
307. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(b) (West 1996) (requiring state
agencies to mitigate or avoid significant environmental impacts when "feasible"); MINN.
STAT. § 116D.04(6) (1998) (requiring the state to adopt a feasible and prudent alternative
that is less environmentally destructive); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1)
(McKinney 1997) (requiring mitigation to the maximum extent practicable); Johnson,
supra note 302, at 598-99; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at
831.
308. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at
348-50 (discussing "super review" and "site designation" models of selecting sites for
hazardous waste facilities; both models require either the state or developer to create an
inventory of alternative sites); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212,
at 819.
309. See generally Kuehn, supra note 142, at 170; Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 334-38.
310. See EPA, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS, supra note 26, at 98, 103-05 (describing Phase I audits in Baltimore, Maryland and Oregon); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3746.04(B)(3), 3746.07(B) (West 1994); Eisen, supra note 4, at 931-32.
311. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 931-32; see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3746.04(B)(3), .07(B) (West 1994).
312. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.04(B)(3)(g), 3746.07(B)-(C) (West
1994); Eisen, supra note 4, at 931-33.
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exists near a site would a CIS need to include more extensive data collection.
h. Risk Assessments
If the proposed project in isolation poses a significant risk of, for instance, a greater than one-in-a-million excess cancer risk, the developer
should conduct a limited risk assessment of the cumulative pollution burden from other sources in the area. If the preliminary data suggests a discrimination problem, a state agency could demand more extensive data
collection and risk analysis. A risk assessment may be cost effective in
the long run if it shows that additional cleanup is unnecessary.313
Developers are likely to object to the cost of conducting a sitespecific risk assessment that examines risks to significant subpopulation
groups. Site-specific risk assessments are information intensive and
hence expensive.314 However, states could minimize risk assessment costs
by requiring a full-scale risk assessment only if a preliminary assessment
shows that a facility's lifetime cancer risk exceeds one in a million, the
standard measure for safety.315 States could adopt a sliding scale for data
collection that requires more information about demographics or risk if,
for instance, the facility's carcinogenic risk is greater than a one-in-onehundred-thousand lifetime cancer risk. Because a risk assessment that
examines the cumulative burden of existing sources is more complex and
expensive than a risk assessment of the proposed facility by itself, states
should only require a comprehensive examination of risk if the proposed
facility poses a significant risk or the surrounding area is known to be of
high risk.
A limited risk assessment conducted by a developer may miss or ignore significant risks. Site-specific risk estimates can differ by a hundred
times or more, depending upon various assumptions. 316 Because of limitations in modeling and monitoring techniques, individualized risk assessments are often inaccurate and require additional monitoring to increase their accuracy.317 While industry would likely criticize the expense
of site-specific risk assessments, the very cost and complexity of such
assessments actually would favor developers with extensive financial and
technical resources. There is the danger that industry or recipients would
use favorable assumptions that minimize a proposal's possible risk to
313. See Gargas & Long, supra note 108, at 226.
314. See, e.g., Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 334-38.
315. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
316. See Applegate, supra note 141, at 265-70; Kuehn, supra note 142, at 133-39;
Rosenthal et a!., supra note 141, at 340-44 (looking at maximally exposed individual near
a factory rather than a hypothetical maximally exposed individual can reduce estimated
exposures by a factor of 100 at some sources).
317. See, e.g., Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 334-38; infra notes 334-339 and accompanying text.
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minority groups or the public health in generaPl8 Accordingly, states
need to consider providing technical assistance to community groups to
allow them to challenge industry data and promote community monitoring programs to ensure that projects are as safe as they are supposed to
be. Alternatively, a state could pay for a limited risk assessment or could
perform a risk assessment and have the developer compensate it. However, community monitoring provides both social and informational
benefits because it increases the likelihood of adequate data collection by
promoting public participation, which often encourages more effective
monitoring by the affected community.
c. Technical Assistance

Community groups often lack the technical competence to challenge
industry safety assumptions. 319 Environmental justice advocates argue
that government should redress this imbalance by providing independent
technical consultants or grants to community organizations for education,
monitoring, or critical evaluation of existing data. 32o They also have argued that technical assistance is especially necessary to enable community groups in poor or minority neighborhoods to challenge industry
data. 321
On the other hand, industry and state representatives usually oppose
such grants or assistance on a number of grounds. They fear such resources will be used for tort suits or other litigation against them. 322 Industry and state regulators often argue that it is inappropriate to fund
such organizations because these grants give the misleading impression
that the receiving group represents the public interest rather than being
accountable only to the regulators' small constituencies. 323 They also
contend that government regulators already adequately protect the public
health. 324
At a minimum, states should provide funding for educational programs to help local communities understand the processes of public participation, environmental permitting, the basic elements of risk assess318. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 133-39; Rosenthal et aI., supra note 141, at
340-44.
319. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 129-33, 144, 162-63; Mank, Environmelltal
Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 834-39; Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 7780.
320. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 834-39;
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 77-80; REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 39-41.
321. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 162-63; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title
VI, supra note 212, at 834-39; Environmental Justice Groups Form Browllfield Advisory
Board, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Feb. 10, 1999, at 10.
322. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 41.
323. See id.
324. See id.
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ment, and community monitoring. 325 Furthermore, despite likely opposition from industry, EPA or states should offer technical assistance to
community groups or provide grants so community groups can hire their
own technical experts to examine industry data. 326
Technical assistance grants are currently too small to level the
playing field. Congress, EPA, and states usually have provided only limited funding for technical assistance programs and grants. 327 EPA has acknowledged that it takes too long for the agency to provide money to
grant recipients. It has promised to amend its technical assistance program to provide small start-up grants of $5,000 to allow recipients to initiate projects.328 Even with proposed reforms, EPA's technical assistance
grants do not sufficiently level the playing field with industry.329 Both
EPA and state agencies rely heavily on regulated industry for information
about the risk of chemicals.330 Additionally, state agencies normally have
greater financial and technical resources than community groups.331 Accordingly, even if states provide some technical assistance to local community groups, such assistance by itself may not be enough to counterbalance the far greater technical and financial resources of industry and
even state regulators. 332
Yet environmental justice advocates argue that even small grants are
valuable. First, they allow groups to develop computer software needed
to collect and assess pollution data or to support travel to public meet-

325. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 834-39;
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 79; Environmental Justice Groups Form Brownfield
Advisory Board, supra note 320, at 10.
326. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 834-39;
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 79.
327. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 835-36, 838;
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 78-79. Between 1988 and 1998, EPA awarded 202
technical assistance grants of up to $50,000 to groups to allow them to comment on and
participate in Superfund remedy decisions. See OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL
RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, SUPERFUND REFORMS ANNUAL REPORT FY 199825,43, EPA-540R-99-002 (1999).
328. See Jennifer Silverman, Top Superfund Issues of 1999, 22 CHEM. REG. REp.
(BNA) (Jan. 22, 1999) (quoting Stephen Luftig, director of EPA's Office of Emergency and
Remedial Response); see also OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S.
EPA, SUPERFUND REFORMS ANNUAL REpORT FY 1998, supra note 326, at 25, 43 (EPA
plans to issue an amended rule in 1999 to simplify its technical assistance program for
Superfund sites).
329. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 144, 162-63; Mank, Environmental Justice and
Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 408; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI,
supra note 212, at 836-38; Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 76.
330. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons From Federal Pesticide Regulation on the
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369,436-37
(1993); Kuehn, supra note 142, at 144.
331. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 162-63; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title
VI, supra note 212, at 837.
332. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 835-36, 838;
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 78-79.

HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 167 2000

168

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 24

ings. 333 Furthermore, providing technical assistance sends a message to
community groups that their views are important. Thus, technical assistance grants are valuable both as a means for community groups to check
the accuracy of industry or state data and to enhance their ability to participate in the environmental decision-making process by asking appropriate questions about technical issues.
d. Community Monitoring Programs

States should fund meaningful community monitoring programs.
Community monitoring programs should be less controversial than technical assistance programs because they do not necessarily imply that industry data is biased, but simply that more information would be helpful.
EPA should provide direct funding for pollution monitoring to local
communities and encourage states to support local monitoring efforts by
giving more favorable consideration to brownfield projects that include
community monitoring. It is important to encourage grassroots monitoring programs because properly trained community residents can often
collect data as well as professionals and can collect more data because
they are not constrained by agencies' limited monitoring budgets.334 Improving the ability of communities to monitor compliance will provide
additional information about the amount of pollution in the area. It would
also allow communities to determine whether current mitigation measures are working effectively. Additionally, EPA has recently suggested
that brownfield projects should be reevaluated every several years over a
period of twenty or more years to determine if the projects meet their
initial economic and pollution expectations.335
EPA and some states already provide some funding for community
monitoring, but more needs to be done. EPA already has an Environmental Monitoring for Public Access and Community Tracking
("EMPACT") Grants Program that provides grants to local communities
to establish community monitoring systems. In fiscal year 1998, the
Office of Environmental Justice expected to award $3.5 million to local
governments to establish pilot programs for its enhanced EMPACT program.336
While financial constraints are likely to continue, new technology
now allows for better and cheaper monitoring. 337 For instance, EPA is
developing computer programs such as LandView, a desktop mapping
system that includes database extracts from the agency and can be
333. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 40-41.
334. See Collin & Collin, supra note 166, at 82.
335. See EPA, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS, supra note 26, at 113.
336. See u.S. EPA, Environmental Monitoring for Public Access and COllllllunity
Tracking (EMPACT) (last modified June 2, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/empact.htm>.
337. See Collin & Collin, supra note 166, at 82.
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downloaded from the Internet, that identify potential emission sources.338
Furthermore, the agency and many states are already beginning to make
information about facilities available to the public through the Internet. 339
EPA has recognized that more needs to be done to encourage community monitoring. The agency is considering including language in its
forthcoming revised Title VI guidance that would instruct regional staff
to provide enforcement training to citizens and environmental justice
groups.340 However, industry opposes such community data collection
efforts because amateur community groups may intentionally or accidentally obtain inaccurate data, money would be better spent on agency
monitoring efforts, and such data could be used for litigation against industry.341 While there are some risks that community monitoring data
could be misused, community monitoring will both provide more information and give communities a greater sense of control over their health
concerns.
EPA should provide greater direct funding for local monitoring programs because existing funding for EMPACT is inadequate. Additionally,
the agency should encourage states and developers to establish and fund
effective community monitoring programs by allowing brownfields projects near residential areas only if such monitoring is available. If they
really believe their projects are safe, developers should welcome community monitoring projects that can confirm that their facilities pose no
significant harm to surrounding populations.
B. Rebutting Discrimination Claims: States Need to Address the Gaps in
EPA's Title VI Policies

Title VI allows states to give developers the opportunity to justify
otherwise unacceptable impacts on a minority group. While some civil
rights advocates might argue that adverse disparate impacts on protected
minority groups should never be allowed, Title VI and VII cases suggest
that defendants may be able to justify disparate impacts through safety or
efficiency justifications, significant cost savings, or the unavailability of
physically suitable alternative sites.342 Accordingly, the Interim Guidance

338. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 22;
LandView III Specialized Computer Mapping Application (last modified July 7, 1999)
<http://www.census.gov/geo/www/tigerflandview.html>.
339. See generally Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything; Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 277 (1998).
340. See Environmental Justice Guide Eyes Citizen Enforcement Training, ENVTL.
POL'y ALERT, Nov. 3, 1999, at 33-34.
341. See id. at 33-34.
342. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 806-07,82328.
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allows the construction of a facility if the federal grant recipient can provide a substantial, legitimate explanation of how the benefits of the facility sufficiently outweigh the cost of these disparate impacts. 343
While civil rights advocates have criticized the use of cost as a
justification for practices having discriminatory effects, courts have allowed cost to be used by defendants as a justification.344 Accordingly,
EPA will probably allow states to use economic benefits to justify a project that meets minimum safety standards, such as a maximum one-in-tenthousand lifetime cancer risk.
Additionally, a developer could argue that it chose a location in a
minority neighborhood rather than an alternative site because technical or
geological factors offered greater safety in the minority neighborhood. 345
Courts have found that safety is a valid justification for a policy that affects a minority group disproportionately but incidentally. However, using geological or technical criteria should not in general adversely affect
minorities because no evidence supports the proposition that minority
areas are located in disproportionately safer locations than majority areas.346 A legitimate and neutrally administered policy focusing on technical criteria could even reduce the incidence of discriminatory siting. 347
Nevertheless, to ensure that cost and safety justifications do not
provide a pretext for discrimination, states should require developers offering a business justification to examine a project's economic benefits
and risks to each significant subpopulation group. While brownfield projects are frequently located in minority neighborhoods, environmental
justice advocates contend that these communities receive few economic
benefits yet bear most of the risks. Accordingly, a developer should perform an analysis of the costs and safety of the project for each subpopulation to ensure that minorities do not disproportionately bear the burdens
of a project while reaping few of the rewards. If a preliminary analysis
suggests that a minority group bears a disproportionate share of the costs
and health risks, a state should require a more detailed cost or safety
justification.
Furthermore, a developer using an economic or safety justification
ought to have the burden of demonstrating that no less discriminatory
alternative brownfield sites would meet its business needs. A developer
should be able to reject an alternative site that fails to meet the essential
needs of its business, but should not be permitted to use insignificant differences to reject an alternative site that would cause substantially less
harm to minority groups. Title VI and VII case law places the burden on
343. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12; supra notes 251-252 and
accompanying text.
344. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 806, 823-26.
345. See id. at 806-07, 826-28.
346. See id.
347. See id.
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the plaintiff to rebut a defendant's legitimate business justification by
demonstrating that it is a pretext for discrimination or that a less discriminatory alternative exists that would meet the defendant's legitimate
business needs, including reasonable cost and safety goals.348 This shifting of burdens also makes sense because developers have the best information about alternatives. 349 However, a state is free to place a greater
burden on developers that seek to enjoy the advantages of a voluntary
cleanup program by requiring them to show an absence of less discriminatory alternatives.
This proposal does not fully address the difficult issue of balancing
the economic benefits of a project against its costs. Still, by requiring an
analysis of the costs and benefits to each significant subpopulation, this
proposal would expose projects that provide small benefits but a high
burden of risk to a minority community. Once this information is available, the agency, developer, and community will have a better opportunity to engage in a public dialogue about weighing these risks and
benefits.
C. Increasing Public Participation to Address Pretext and Less

Discriminatory Alternatives
To avoid successful Title VI claims, a state must ensure that its
siting and permitting processes do not exclude community input into the
decision-making process. While brownfield locations already exist and
are already polluted, a developer should have to explain why it is appropriate to redevelop that site rather than possible alternative sites. Accordingly, voluntary action programs should not ignore the need to consider alternative sites even though consideration of alternatives does involve some additional cost. State policies restricting public participation
in environmental decision-making are short-sighted because they increase the likelihood that local residents will file a Title VI complaint.350
Instead, a state should require community involvement and public participation early in the permitting process to consider mitigation measures, the costs and benefits of a project, and especially any less discriminatory alternatives. States should create citizen advisory boards composed of a diverse range of stakeholders to facilitate early and meaningful public participation by a wide range of citizens.351 Citizen groups,
348. See Georgia St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417
(11th Cir. 1985) (stating that plaintiff must present "equally effective" alternative sites);
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. at 128 (concluding
that plaintiff failed to present specific alternative sites); Mank, Environmental Justice and
Title VI, supra note 212, at 808-09, 822-23.
349. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 820-42.
350. See id. at 840-43.
351. See Gauna, supra note 182, at 57-65 (discussing use of advisory committees to
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those neighbors most affected by a project, minority groups, and local
community leaders should have the opportunity to offer suggestions for
improving brownfield proposals to enable developers to fine-tune these
projects so they produce greater benefits to the community at lower
risk. 352 Even if EPA does not require early participation programs, states
should adopt them as a matter of good policy.
Increasing public participation in the approval of brownfield projects ought to be a goal upon which everyone can agree. While its members have disagreed about many issues, EPA's Title VI Advisory Committee has encouraged states to adopt policies promoting early and
meaningful participation by community groups.3S3 Community input can
improve environmental decision-making by providing additional data
about potential sources of contamination and likely exposure pathways,
including sensitive subpopulations.354
However, there likely will be disagreement between environmental
justice groups and developers over whether community groups should
have an advisory role or an actual veto. Environmental justice groups
believe that EPA or states should require developers to obtain approval
from community groups to utilize lower standards for industrial level
cleanups.355 Conversely, industry as well as most state and federal regulators would strongly oppose giving veto power to a single or even a
majority of participating community groups. A possible solution would
be to place a heightened burden of justification on a decision if a majority of community groups participating in a community advisory group
oppose a project. 356
Controversy also surrounds the issue of whether EPA should defer
to states or local governments that have programs promoting early and
meaningful public participation. 3S7 State and industry members of EPA's

address environmental justice issues); John C. Duncan, Multicultural Participation in the
Public Hearing Process: Some Theoretical, Pragmatical, and Analeptical Considerations,
24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169,238-41 (1999).
352. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 840-42;
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 73-77.
353. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 11-13,
33; Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Title VI Advisory Panel Report Sets Ollt Isslles,
Gives No Recommendations, supra note 264, at 2188; see also EPA, SUSTAINABLE
BROWNFIELDS, supra note 26, at 51 (recommending "early, adequate, and meaningful
community involvement in the [brownfield] decision-making process").
354. See U.S. EPA, RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE FOR SUPERFUND: VOLUME 1HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL SUPPLEMENT TO PART A: COMMUNITY
INVOLVEMENT IN SUPERFUND RISK ASSESSMENTS (1999).
355. See Environmental Justice Groups Form Brownfield Advisory Board, ENVTL.
PoL'Y ALERT, Feb. 10, 1999, at 10.
356. See Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 75-76 (proposing process for EPA's
Project XL that allows stakeholders in public participation scheme to increase scrutiny of
the proposal if a majority opposes project).
357. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 842; Kenneth
Warren, Environmental Justice Revisited, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 17, 1998, at 7.
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Title VI Advisory Committee have argued that EPA should give more
deference to state decisions that include proactive public participation
efforts such as early community involvement and a community impact
statement. Environmental justice advocates, on the other hand, have
questioned whether the agency should establish special incentives for
state and local governments to comply with the law. 358 However, a serious
issue arises as to whether the agency has the legal authority to give such
deference when a Title VI complaint alleges that a state or local agency
has violated the civil rights of minority groups protected by Title VI. 359
Furthermore, while the agency should give greater deference to a decision supported by broad popular involvement, EPA should not automatically defer to any state action that causes significant disparate impacts.
1. Brownfield Programs Often Limit Public Participation

Unfortunately, many states limit or do not require public participation in the approval of brownfield projects. 360 They limit or preclude public participation to avoid lengthy public debates that may delay and increase the cost of brownfield projects. 361 For example, Ohio's voluntary
action program virtually eliminates public participation in individual
cleanup decisions on the theory that the public had the opportunity to
participate in setting state cleanup standards. 362 Under Ohio's voluntary
cleanup program, a certified professional may approve a cleanup plan and
simply send notice to the state.363 The volunteer does not have to provide
notice to the public until after the cleanup is completed. 364 Furthermore,
in Ohio, any reports or information about the investigation and cleanup
of a site remain confidential and are not admissible or discoverable in a
civil suit or administrative action against the volunteer unless the certified

358. See REpORT OF THE nTLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 26-29;
Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 842 (discussing proposals by
state government officials for EPA to give greater deference in Title VI disputes to state
agencies with programs that encourage public involvement in permitting process).
359. See REPORT OF THE nTLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 27-28.
360. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 972 (listing several states not requiring any public
participation); Bradford C. Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup and Redevelopment
Process, in 1 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE § 31.02[4] (Michael Gerrard ed., 1998).
361. See generally Eisen, supra note 4, at 972; Mank, Public Participation in the
Cleanup and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[4]; Sweeney, supra note 4,
at 160.
362. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 972; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup and
Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[4].
363. In Ohio, the state retains the authority to audit a cleanup, but does so in only
25% of sites participating. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10 (1998); OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 3745-300-14(D) (1998) (providing for random audits of 25% of sites in which a
certified professional has issued a no-action letter).
364. In Ohio, the public has a right to participate in the approval of a cleanup plan
only if the volunteer applies for a variance from applicable cleanup standards. See OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-12(H)(3) (1998); Eisen, supra note 3, at 972 n.384.
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professional responsible for reviewing the cleanup finds a "threat or danger to public health or safety or the environment" or the state brings a
criminal prosecution against the volunteer. 365
In many states, the public has only limited rights to notice of a proposed cleanup plan under a voluntary action program. While the type of
notice varies from state to state, a typical brownfield statute requires a
developer to notify the state environmental agency and obtain its approval of the plan, provide a copy of the plan to the local government,
and publish a short notice of the availability of the plan in a local newspaper of general circulation. 366 Most states do not require individual notice to residents in the host community or even to contiguous property
owners.367 Many states limit public participation to a short public comment period, often between fourteen and thirty days.368 Only a minority
of states require a public hearing, and usually a hearing is required only
if there is a written request. 369
Many states provide for public participation only after the developer
prepares a voluntary remedial work plan. 370 For instance, Rhode Island
encourages community involvement, but explicitly only requires additional notice to nearby residents when a site investigation is complete and
does not give residents an opportunity to participate early in the planning
process. 371 It is usually more difficult to challenge a completed work than
36S. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.28(C), (D) (1998) (stating information or documents produced in voluntary action program are not admissible or discoverable in any civil
or administrative proceeding brought against the volunteer); see also Sweeney, supra note
4, at 127-28. See generally OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.071(B)(I)(c) (1998) (stating
certified professional must notify Ohio EPA if voluntary cleanup threatens public safety,
welfare, or health).
366. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3S, §§ 6026.302(e), 6026.303(h),
6026.304(n)(I)(i) (West 1999); Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[1].
367. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 974; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup and
Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[1].
368. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 2S398.6(i)(I),(2), .7(c)(2) (West
1999) (providing for 30-day notice and comment period); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2S-S-1I(b)
(West 1995) (providing for 30-day notice and comment period); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7S10-73S (1997) (providing for 30-day comment period); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-1l(a)
(1998) (providing for 14-day comment period); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 661Sa(h)(S)
(1997) (providing for IS-day comment period); Eisen, supra note 4, at 973-74; Mank,
Public Participation in the Cleanup and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360,
§ 31.02[2].
369. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 2S39S.6(i)(3) (West 1999) (requiring one or more public meetings for information or comment); IND. CODE § 13-2S-S-11(c)
(1998) (providing for public hearing upon written request during notice and comment period); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.1404 (199S) (providing 10 or more persons may
request designation of site as "Public Involvement Plan" site); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7S-1O73S(2) (1997) (providing for 30-day comment period and for public hearing upon written
request by "ten or more persons ... or by a local governing body of a city, town, or
county"); Eisen, supra note 4, at 974--7S, 977; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup
and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[3].
370. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 13-2S-S-11(b) (1998); Eisen, supra note 4, at 100S-0S.
371. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-S, -11 (1998); Eisen, supra note 4, at 1007-08.
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one in its early stages because the developer may have taken preliminary
steps toward construction that make it more difficult to modify the project or move it to a different 10cation.372 In several states, the host municipality can demand a public hearing, but citizens do not have the right to
require a hearing. 373 Giving participation rights only to the host municipality is problematic because it may not protect the rights of all those
affected by a proposal since elected officials may not truly represent
certain potentially affected groups.374 Even the rights of host municipalities are limited in many states since they may not replace statewide generic cleanup standards with different cleanup standards.375 Only California gives local communities or counties the presumptive authority to determine a site's future use, subject to state approval at a hearing.376 Accordingly, local communities may not have sufficient authority to protect
vulnerable minorities.
Current public participation procedures are inadequate because they
provide no mechanisms for encouraging the poor and disempowered to
participate. An active public participation policy that encourages dialogue by a wide range of citizens is needed. Several states require the
state environmental agency that receives comments to consider and perhaps respond to any public comment that raises significant issues. 377
However, no state requires an agency to reject a cleanup plan in the face
of substantial public opposition.378 On the other hand, allowing local
community groups veto authority over controversial projects may only
increase the tendency of developers to avoid wealthy and politically
powerful areas and to site undesirable facilities in poor, minority neighborhoods that are often politically powerless. 379

372. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1004-09; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 711.
373. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 324.20120d(3)(c)(i)-(iii) (West 1999) (city,
township, village, or local health department can demand a public hearing; state in its discretion may require public hearing if it believes significant public interest would benefit or
if appropriate); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West 1999) (municipality can demand public hearing if developer elects site-specific cleanup criteria); Eisen, supra note 4,
at 972.
374. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1011.
375. See id. at 1004-09.
376. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398(d)(2) (West 1999); Eisen, supra
note 3, at 975 n.392, 1005.
377. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.6G) (West 1999); IND. CODE
ANN. § 13-25-5-11(c) (West 1998); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 324.20120d(5)(e) (West
1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-735(3) (1998); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.320(3), .325(4)(d)
(1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-11(a) (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(h)(5)
(1997); Eisen, supra note 4, at 975-76 n.393; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup
and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[2].
378. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 975-76; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup
and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[2].
379. See Arnold, supra note 23, at 27; Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up:
Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Envir01l1nental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REv. 775, 833-37 (1998).
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Instead, an intermediate policy is needed that actively promotes
participation by a diverse range of voices without giving anyone group
veto power. One way to reduce the impact of wealth in siting decisions is
to have an open process that requires the consideration of alternative sites
and encourages a wide range of participants. Accordingly, public opposition ought to be considered when states and EPA review a proposed voluntary action project, but only if a wide range of voices are able to participate and alternative sites are considered.
Under a new brownfields act, North Carolina now provides a sixtyday notice and comment period in which members of the public can
comment on a proposed brownfield project, "including methods and degree of remediation, future land uses and impact on local employment."38o
Any member of the public may petition for a public hearing, but the
North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources has
discretion to hold a hearing based on its assessment of whether "there is
significant public interest in the proposed brownfields agreement."381 The
statute requires the Department to consider public comments received
during the comment period or at a public meeting in approving a
brownfield project, especially "written comment that is supported by
valid scientific and technical information and analysis."382 While North
Carolina's procedures for ensuring public participation in the approval of
brownfield projects are superior to most states, even these procedures do
not guarantee early public involvement in formulating development and
cleanup plans.383 States need to promote such early involvement.
2. Promoting Early and Meaningful Participation: Creating a
Partnership Between States and EPA
Public participation is likely to be meaningful only if community
groups may participate early in the process so they can influence a project's design and location. 384 Environmental justice advocates therefore
favor early participation in the decision-making process. EPA's revised
Title VI guidance should encourage states to establish community advisory boards that participate early in the planning process for redeveloping brownfield projects. In its planned Guidance advising states on how
to comply with Title VI, EPA should urge states to include a diverse

380. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-31O.34(b) (1997); see also Hawley, supra note 8, at
1035,1044.
381. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-31O.34(c) (1997); Hawley, supra note 8, at 1035,
1044 (stating North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources must hold
public hearing on brownfield project if agency considers it in public interest to hold such a
hearing).
382. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.34(d) (1997).
383. See Hawley, supra note 8, at 1045.
384. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1004-09; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 711.
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range of citizens on such advisory boards, especially members of minority groups and those at highest risk from the project.385
To encourage broad and early participation, states must engage in
aggressive outreach to embrace a broad spectrum of the public. State
statutes often only require developers to provide a short notice through
general circulation newspapers, but most people never read such notices. 386 States should require notification in utility bills, the use of community liaison staff, and notification in languages other than English
where appropriate. 387 Agencies should choose convenient meeting times
and places for public meetings and conduct public education classes
about both scientific issues and methods for effective participation in
agency decisions. 388
EPA and several states have recognized that early participation procedures can sometimes reduce conflict about and community opposition
to certain projects. EPA's Advisory Committee on Title VI recommends
that states include community members early in the decision-making
process and attempt to resolve environmental justice issues before making permit decisions. 389 EPA encourages states to create "three-legged"
networks of governments, businesses, and minority communities to discuss the racial implications of siting decisions. 39o To reduce the number
of Title VI complaints and to gain favor with EPA, a few states have already implemented early participation procedures.391 For instance, New
York has created an environmental justice program and appointed a coordinator to promote community involvement in the state's environmental
permitting process.392 In November 1998, EPA awarded $100,000 grants
385. Cf Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at
401-19 (arguing that citizen advisory boards often do not include members of minority
groups or those at highest risk from pollution).
386. See REPORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 50-51.
387. See id.
388. See id.
389. See id. at 11-12, 33.
390. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Permits Cited in Civil Rights Complaints Have Remained Valid, 152 DAILY ENV'T REp. (BNA) A-9 (Aug. 7, 1998); Mank,
Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, 84~2.
391. See Pollution in Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce,
105th Congo (1998) (testimony of Michael Hogan, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) (indicating that New Jersey is adopting "inclusive collaborative process
to address issues of environmental equity" and an "upfrontJproactive environmental equity
process" that allows local minority and low-income communities to have "input into the
permitting process when it is most meaningful, before the permit is issued"); Pollution in
Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Congo (1998) (testimony
of Barry McBee, Chairman of Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) (indicating that Texas seeks to provide citizens with opportunities for early, meaningful input
into permitting process); Hogue, Permits Have Remained Valid, supra note 390, at A-9;
Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, 84~2.
392. See New York: To Improve Input on Permits, State Creates Environmental Justice Program, 30 Env't Rep.(BNA), 1114 (Oct. 15, 1999).
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to four states and one Native American tribe to develop model programs
promoting environmental justice.393 However, complaints have already
been made that New Jersey's model program under the grant, the Advisory Council on Environmental Justice, has no real decision-making
power. 394
3. Community Advisory Boards

To facilitate early and meaningful community participation, states
should create citizen advisory boards to provide advice on the siting of
brownfield projects. A citizen advisory board potentially can provide
ideas and suggestions about a broad range of issues, including possible
alternative sites or proposals, community relations, monitoring, mitigation, and economic development. For example, in 1994, legislation was
introduced in Congress that would have amended CERCLA to require
EPA to establish a Community Working Group ("CWG") at each Superfund site whenever a state or fifty citizens requested the formation of
such a group.395 The legislation would have required EPA to select at
least fifty percent of the members of the CWG from local residents and
also specified that the agency include particular health and technical experts.396 Most notably, the CWG could make recommendations to the
agency about choice of cleanup standards, including the site's future land
use and whether institutional controls should be used instead of permanent treatment methods. 397 However, the proposal died when Congress
failed to enact a comprehensive Superfund reform bill in 1994. States
could create groups similar to CWGs to evaluate brownfield proposals. 398
For instance, Pennsylvania authorizes, but does not require, the establishment of community-based advisory groups on brownfields. 399
While the CWG proposal represented a step in the right direction,
some environmental justice advocates have argued that it did not go far
enough to guarantee adequate representation of minority groups or those
at greatest risk from a facility.4°O They suggested that the CWG membership could include facility owners, potentially responsible parties, workers at the facility, members of the local business community, and local
393. See Merkel, supra note 206.
394. See Environmentalists Say Whitman Fails in Promise, RECORD, Northern N.J.,
June 4,1999, at L7.
395. Fewer than 50 citizens could demand a CWG if they represented at least 20%
of the population of the locality in which an National Priority List site was located. See
H.R. 3800, 103d Congo § 102 (1994) (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(g)(l)(A».
396. See id. (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(g)(5».
397. See S. 1834, 103d Congo § 103 (1994) (proposing to amend CERCLA
§ 117(i»; H.R. 3800 (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(g); see also Foster, supra note
379, at 835-36 (discussing CWG proposal); Ayers, supra note 112, at 1511-12 (same).
398. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1017-19.
399. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (1993).
400. See infra notes 401-404, 424 and accompanying text.
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government officials who did not necessarily have the same interests as
those at greatest risk.401 There was a risk, however, that the presence of
these groups might have prevented the achievement of consensus recommendations and thus weakened the value of any recommendations by the
CWG to EPA.402
To avoid the limitations of the CWG scheme, some commentators
have suggested that states should develop community-based advisory
boards modeled after the Restoration Advisory Boards ("RABs") that are
used to solicit community views about military base closures.403 RABs
have the advantage of a governing statute which requires public involvement throughout the closure process rather than at only one or two points
in a long process. 404
Whether such a board would have only an advisory function or
genuine decision-making authority is an important question. 405 EPA's case
studies of seven pilot projects involving twenty separate sites found that
the level of decision-making authority given to community residents
varied greatly. Their positions ranged from being voting members of a
pilot project's site-selection committee to being mere observers.406 The
proposed Superfund legislation that created CWGs would have required
EPA to give "substantial weight" to the CWG's recommendations when
the CWG achieved consensus regarding "the reasonably anticipated future use of the land at the facility."407 However, the agency was not bound
to follow the CWG's proposals.40s If a board is reasonably large and
sufficiently representative of the community, it may be appropriate to
give it veto power. A state should at least require stronger justification for
a project if there is significant public opposition.
4. How Much Deference Does Public Participation Deserve?

If states adopt proposals to increase public participation, one can
argue that EPA should give greater deference to those states' environ401. See S. 1834 (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(i»; H.R. 3800 (proposing to
amend CERCLA § 117(g)); see also Kathy Bunting, Risk Assessment and Environmental
Justice: A Critique of the Current Legal Framework and Suggestions for the Future, 3
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 157 (1995).
402. See Bunting, supra note 401, at 157.
403. See Eisen, Brownfield Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 1, at 226;
KibeI, supra note 1, at 617-18.
404. See 10 U.S.C. § 2705(d)-(f)(I)-(5) (1994 & Supp. ill 1997); Eisen, Brownfield
Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 1, at 226-27 & n.209; KibeI, supra note 1, at
617-18.
405. See Foster, supra note 379, at 833-37; Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 369-70,401-19.
406. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY REsPONSE, U.S. EPA,
BROWNFIELDS TITLE VI CASE STUDIES: SUMMARY REpORT 5, 10-11, 500-R-99-003 (1999).
407. H.R. 3800, § 117(g)(3); S. 1834, § 103 (Version 4, Oct. 3, 1994) (proposing to
amend CERCLA § 117(1)(3».
408. See H.R. 3800, § 117(g)(3); S. 1834, § 103.
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mental decisions because they presumably enjoy broad public support.
Some state officials want EPA to approve pre-licensing procedures that
create a shield against any Title VI complaints, or that create a presumption that the complaints lack substance if a state allowed for ample community involvement.409
On October 3, 1999, Ann Goode, director of EPA's Office of Civil
Rights, told a group of state environmental commissioners that the
agency plans to give considerable deference to states with strong environmental justice programs if a Title VI complaint is filed against the
state.410 Although acknowledging that Title VI does not allow EPA to
provide states with guaranteed immunity from Title VI complaints,
Goode stated that the agency will be unlikely to pursue complaints
brought against states that have a quality program that includes either a
broad outreach program to identify and address environmental justice
issues or a narrower public participation program that requires outreach
to stakeholders affected by an individual permit application. 411 While she
declined to provide details until the agency's top officials reach consensus and issue a revised guidance, Goode also announced that the agency's
forthcoming revised Title VI guidance will provide several factors that
the agency will use to evaluate whether a state has a good program.412 In
response to state concerns that it is unclear what sanctions EPA would
impose if it finds a state in violation of Title VI, Goode stated that the
agency almost always seeks to avoid the "nuclear option" of withdrawing
a state's federal funding. 413
In a close Title VI case, EPA should give some deference to a state
that is earnestly trying to encourage public participation by a wide range
of stakeholders and to avoid disparate impacts. Because the agency has
considerable discretion in what sanction it may impose for a violation
and tries to avoid imposing sanctions against states that act in good faith,
it makes sense for the agency to focus on states that do not have a good
program for addressing Title VI problems or have a pattern of violations.414
Nevertheless, EPA's proposal for strong deference goes too far. Title
VI implies that federal funding agencies should evaluate each complaint
on the merits. EPA should carefully evaluate each case to determine if a
409. See Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 840-42.
410. See EPA Plans Strong Deference to State Environmental Justice Programs,
ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Oct. 20,1999, at 31-32.
411. See id. at 32.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. For example, EPA, on as least two occasions, has considered a statewide review of whether Louisiana's Department of Environmental Quality systematically discriminated against minorities, but EPA has not chosen to proceed with such a contentious
review. See EPA Moving Toward Statewide Environmental Equity Review in Louisiana,
ENVTL. PoL'y ALERT, Dec. 30, 1998, at 3.
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state environmental agency's approval of a brownfield project causes disparate impacts to a protected minority group. In contrast, EPA plans to
take into account the quality of a state environmental justice program,
especially the extent to which a state actively encourages the participation of minorities in the early decisions about where to site a project.

a. Public Participation Does Not Guarantee Fairness
The availability of public participation arguably lessens, but does
not eliminate the possibility of discriminatory decision-making for several reasons. First, it cannot be assumed that procedures for increased
public participation will necessarily address the fundamental differences
in expertise and resources between minority communities and industry.415
Environmental agencies may ignore or discount the comments of community members because of subtle biases against members of minority
groups or in favor of industry experts with advanced degrees. 416 Existing
public participation practices often ignore the fact that different cultural
and ethnic groups have different ways of participating or communicating
that may hinder them in engaging in environmental decision-making.417
Furthermore, temporal, financial, educational, or language barriers may
make it more difficult for minorities to participate in such decisions. 418
Because high-income whites may use the political process more effectively than low-income minorities, developers may steer controversial
projects to poorer communities.419 Second, community advisory groups
may not be sufficiently representative of the community at large. It is
important that these boards include a significant percentage of local residents. For example, proposed legislation that would have established
CWG to evaluate Superfund cleanup proposals required that at least fifty
percent of the members of the CWG be local residents. 42o
Third, even if there is a sufficient number of community representatives, the problem of who selects the community representatives remains.
415. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 161-62; Gauna, supra note 182, at 31-36,67-69
(arguing overemphasis on expertise leads decision makers to undervalue the contributions
of community groups in proposing environmental ideas); Mank, Project XL, supra note
170, at 76-77.
416. See Duncan, supra note 351, at 188-93, 209-12 (discussing cultural barriers to
participation in environmental decisions and arguing environmental agencies are biased in
favor of so-called "experts"); Gauna, supra note 182, at 31-36,67-69.
417. See Duncan, supra note 351, at 188-93.
418. See id. at 193-99.
419. See Foster, supra note 379, at 800-01, 830 (arguing the private sector singles
out politically weak lower-class, minority neighborhoods for hazardous waste facilities);
Mank, Ellvirollmelltal Justice alld Discrimillatory Sitillg, supra note 188, at 349-50, 36869 (arguing that wealthy communities often use public participation procedures to block
controversial or undesirable projects and therefore developers tend to steer unpopular projects to politically vulnerable poor and minority communities).
420. See H.R. 3800, § 102 (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(g)(5)); Eisen, supra note 4, at 1018 n.629.
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At one extreme, states could allow volunteers to select members of the
advisory board. For instance, in Project XL, EPA allows the company
proposing the project to choose stakeholders. The agency ultimately reviews the fairness of the selection process after the final proposal is submitted to the agency.421 Such a procedure is unacceptable, however, because there is no guarantee that an applicant will pick a representative
range of community leaders. It is more appropriate to have state environmental agencies choose members of advisory boards. State environmental agencies are at least somewhat accountable to the public because
of the requirements for public hearings, public access to agency documents through state freedom of information laws, and the selection of
agency heads by elected officials.
Fourth, the criteria for selection of appropriate community representatives usually represent the greatest challenge in establishing an effective citizen advisory board.422 To assist agencies in choosing a diverse
range of stakeholders, states should enact legislation or regulations that
contain specific criteria for selection to prevent arbitrary decisionmaking. Selection procedures for community advisory boards usually
require that a board include environmental scientists or engineers, health
experts, elected officials, and some community representatives. 423 Because members of minority groups are often poor and not involved in
politics, many environmental justice advocates are skeptical about
whether CWGs or similar community advisory boards will be sufficiently
representative of the citizens at highest risk from a project. 424
b. Title VI Provides No Support for Automatic Deference

Title VI provides no basis for EPA automatically to defer to states
that have public participation programs. Under Title VI and the Administrative Procedure Act, EPA enjoys significant discretion in deciding
Title VI complaints, but its decisions are subject to very limited judicial
review to prevent arbitrary and capricious decisions. 425 Title VI requires

421. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects: Notice of Modifications to
Project XL, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,878-79 (1997); Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at
73-74.
422. See Foster, supra note 379, at 833-37; Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 369-70,401-19.
423. See Foster, supra note 379, at 833-37 (discussing selection and role of citizen
advisory boards); Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188,
at 401-19 (arguing community-based siting boards often do not adequately represent minority groups or those at highest risk, but should do so); Mata, supra note 303, at 450-51,
458 (proposing separate technical review board of technical experts and local review board
of local citizens).
424. See Foster, supra note 379, at 833-37; Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 401-19 (arguing community-based siting boards
often do not adequately represent minority groups or those at highest risk).
425. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 715 (1979) (suggesting
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EPA to find a violation if a state makes a decision that causes significant
disparate impact and lacks any legitimate justification.426
While some environmentalists want to give community groups veto
power over proposals, such a grant of power should be approached with
caution. Nothing in Title VI requires that states create a local community
advisory group or give it such veto power as long as a project does not
create a significant disparate impact. As a matter of policy, neither states
nor EPA should give veto power to a single community group because it
may not be representative of the entire community.427 At most, a citizen
board should have a veto power only if it is broadly representative of a
community. Even if a board is representative, it is probably better to allow a state environmental agency to review its decisions to ensure that it
makes consistent determinations. Because they are subject to public
scrutiny and supervision by elected officials, state environmental agencies are less likely to be corrupted by political influence than a relatively
small community advisory board.

c. EPA Should Give Limited Deference to States with Good
Public Participation Programs
If a state adopts effective and meaningful procedures encouraging
early participation, EPA should take such participation into account when
reviewing a Title VI complaint. Because the agency could presume that
the complainant's views were considered by the state agency, it could
place a higher burden on the complainant to demonstrate that the state or
local agency unfairly ignored important evidence of discriminatory impact. 428 For instance, if a state involves the public in decisions about a
site's future use, then there should be a greater presumption that the site
will be used for the agreed purpose. 429 EPA should be careful, however, to
insure that a state or local government considered the project's risks and
benefits, not just to the general population, but also to each significant
subpopulation that might be adversely affected. 430
EPA could give more deference to decisions that include early
community involvement by shifting the burdens of production and proof
to the complainant to show that the state failed to consider or suitably
Title VI generally does not allow private suits against the federal government); Fisher,
supra note 161, at 317 n.158 (arguing neither APA nor Title VI usually allow complainant
to challenge EPA's dismissal of Title VI complaint); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 29
(same).
426. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 795-96, 799802,807.
427. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1019.
428. See generally REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3,
at 36; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 840-42.
429. See Ayers, supra note 112, at 1511-12. See generally Mank, Environmental
Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 842.
430. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 842.
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address significant disparate impacts despite the presence of a wellfunctioning public participation program. Conversely, if there is substantial opposition from the affected communities, especially those at greatest risk, EPA should place a greater burden of justification on the recipient. This type of burden-shifting was contemplated by the proposed legislation to create CWGs which would have required EPA to give "substantial weight" to the Group's recommendations, but would not have
bound the agency to the CWG's proposals.431 In a close case where evidence of disproportionate impact is disputed, EPA should consider
whether a state consulted a wide range of stakeholders and especially
whether the immediate community had a say in the decision-making process. If a state agency fairly considered alternatives proposed by the
public, but concluded that cost, safety, or other valid non-discriminatory
business justifications precluded the siting of the facility in the alternative location, then EPA should give some deference to the recipient's
policy judgment.432 While a brownfield is fixed at one location, the decision whether to redevelop it or redevelop an alternative location raises all
of the issues that normally accompany siting decisions.
Additionally, rather than automatically deferring to states with good
public participation programs, the agency could encourage states to promote public participation by expediting the agency review of a Title VI
complaint if a state or local government has an effective public participation program. An expedited review can be justified by the presumption
that a state or local government with an effective public participation
program is more likely to create a well-developed public record, allowing
for a decision without extensive investigation.433 For example, EPA
justified its expedited review of the Select Steel complaint on the grounds
that Michigan provided a detailed record that allowed the agency to reach
a quick decision. 434
VIII. CONCLUSION: STATES SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN
ADDRESSING TITLE VI CONCERNS ABOUT BROWNFIELD PROJECTS

'.

The environmental justice movement has raised serious concerns
about the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Environmental justice advocates fear that this redevelopment may disproportionately affect minority
and low-income populations because most brownfields are concentrated
in minority and lower-income neighborhoods. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that state brownfield programs typically do not consider
whether a project will have a disproportionate impact on minority
431.
432.
433.
434.

See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 826, 828.
See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 35-36.
See Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 49.
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groups. State brownfield programs also usually do not consider the cumulative burden of the project and existing sources of pollution. Furthermore, these programs are systemically flawed because they often allow lower health standards in industrial areas or in projected nonresidential areas. Because minorities are more likely to live in these areas, state
brownfield programs may disproportionately increase health risks to minority groups, raising serious discrimination concerns under Title VI.
EPA is currently revising its Title VI policy, but states do not need
to wait for the agency to finish this process before fixing their brownfield
programs. First, when making a preliminary assessment of whether there
is a prima facie case of discrimination, states must identify high-risk areas where both cumulative pollution burdens and minority populations
are high. A state program that identifies high-risk minority areas would
not prevent brownfield redevelopment in such communities if a developer
could offer good reasons for a project.435 One way a developer could meet
this requirement would be to prepare a community impact statement. In
the impact statement, states should require the developer to examine
mitigation measures, the costs and benefits of projects, and the existence
of less discriminatory or environmentally damaging alternatives. States
could minimize the cost of collecting demographic and cumulative pollution data by allowing brownfield developers to conduct a less expensive
Phase I audit to determine if more extensive research is necessary. To
help communities provide meaningful comments in response to a community impact statement, states could provide technical assistance to
community groups. Furthermore, to ensure that developers fulfill their
promises, states should provide funding to develop effective community
monitoring programs.
Second, a Title VI defendant may refute a prima facie case of disparate impact by proffering a legitimate non-discriminatory business
justification for a practice causing an adverse impact. In response to this
part of the statute, states should amend their voluntary action programs to
require a developer to explain the economic 'and safety justifications for
the project and how it affects each significant minority subpopulation. An
analysis of the project's benefits and risks to particular subpopulations
will encourage developers to address the health and economic needs of
all members of a community.
Finally, states should develop procedures to promote early and
meaningful public participation in the approval of voluntary cleanups and
brownfield projects. States have an incentive to adopt public participation
procedures because citizens that have the opportunity to participate in a
meaningful decision-making process may be less likely to file a Title VI
complaint.436 To encourage public participation, states should establish
435. See supra notes 251-252, 295, 342-349 and accompanying text.
436. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 840-42; su-
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programs to fonn citizen advisory boards composed of a diverse range of
stakeholders. These boards would facilitate public evaluation of the suitability of projects by a wide range of citizens. A diverse group of citizens
should have either the opportunity to serve on a board or to comment on
proposals. Even if EPA does not encourage such early participation programs, states should adopt them.
When evaluating a Title VI complaint against a state or local government, EPA should examine whether the state or local government considered community views about a project's risks and benefits to different
subpopulations. EPA should give more deference to decisions that had
early community involvement and a community impact statement. If the
public had a reasonable opportunity to participate in the selection and
approval of a project, EPA could increase the burden on the complainant
to explain why the project creates unacceptable disparate impacts in spite
of that participation. However, while increasing public participation is
highly desirable, EPA should not automatically dismiss Title VI complaints against states with public participation programs, because such
participation does not necessarily prevent disparate impacts against minorities.
Together, the proposals outlined above would reduce the chances
that a brownfield project would disproportionately harm racial minority
groups. Minority and low-income communities need more information
and a greater opportunity for meaningful participation. While potentially
costly in some instances, the proposals can be implemented in a costsensitive manner by EPA and states to allow reasonably safe brownfield
projects to go forward. If developers provide comprehensive information
about the risks and benefits of brownfield redevelopment and alternative
projects, a local community can decide which types of projects will provide long-tenn benefits to that neighborhood.
Despite the advantages of refonning their brownfield programs,
many states are likely to wait until EPA issues its long-delayed guidance
on Title VI. It is important to address the likely advantages and shortcomings of the impending revised guidance. While some of the details
remain secret, EPA has suggested that the revised guidance will encourage states to develop public participation programs that foster early participation, and that the agency will instruct its regional staff to train citizens in collecting community data. These proposals are a step in the right
direction, but the agency should more aggressively push states to enhance
opportunities for early and meaningful participation and to make community data collection an integral part of brownfield decisions. EPA's
plans to give states strong deference if they have a good environmental
justice program goes too far in putting administrative convenience ahead
of the need to consider the merits of individual Title VI complaints. EPA
pra notes 284, 350 and accompanying text.
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can take into account a state's overall record when it imposes sanctions,
but it cannot ignore specific instances of disparate impact discrimination
merely because a state's record is usually good. Finally, the revised guidance is unlikely to require states to impose specific procedural requirements such as a community impact statement. Nevertheless, a CIS is the
most effective means of forcing applicants to address critical issues, such
as the extent of any disproportionate impacts, the racial composition of
surrounding neighborhoods, mitigation measures, or alternatives. To
protect their vulnerable populations from the potential harms that may
result from brownfield redevelopment, states will likely need to go beyond the letter of the revised guidance and to adopt the proposals in this
Article.
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